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Abstract 
This Article addresses one of the most difficult issues under the reasonable 
accommodation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): how to resolve the 
conflict that arises when accommodating a disabled employee negatively affects or interferes 
with the rights of other employees. Several scholars and the Supreme Court (in US Airways v. 
Barnett)1 have weighed in on this debate but their analyses fall short of the ultimate goal of this 
Article—to achieve equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities without unnecessarily 
interfering with the rights of other employees. In order to achieve that goal, this Article proposes 
a statutory amendment to the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA. This amendment 
would make reasonable most accommodations that affect other employees, unless the 
accommodation results in the termination of another employee. In this way, more productive 
disabled employees will remain employed, while only placing a reasonable burden on the rest of 
the workforce.  
INTRODUCTION
Employees often have a negative, even visceral reaction to being treated differently from 
someone else in the workplace. Thus, it is not surprising that a decision to give a disabled 
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invaluable feedback I received from John Applegate, Joel Goldstein, Lyrissa Lidsky, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Michael 
Simons, and all of the other participants at “Jurisgenesis: New Voices on the Law,” at Washington University in 
Saint Louis, MO, where I presented this Article.  
1 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
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employee a special benefit or a waiver from a rule or policy applied to all other employees will 
often be met with significant hostility by other employees. Accordingly, employers are reluctant 
to provide these benefits or waivers (collectively called accommodations) even when they may 
be required to allow a disabled employee to remain a productive member of the workforce. The 
negative reaction is magnified when these accommodations not only benefit the disabled 
employee but also arguably harm the non-disabled co-workers. This conflict between disabled 
employees and their non-disabled co-workers is the subject of this Article.  
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted to help individuals with 
disabilities achieve equal opportunity in the workplace and society.2 Under Title I of the ADA, 
an employer is required to provide a qualified disabled employee with a reasonable 
accommodation that will allow the disabled employee to perform the essential functions of the 
job.3 There are several examples of accommodations listed in the statute, and they include 
making the workplace accessible, modifying the work environment or the job structure, 
providing alternative work schedules, and reassigning a disabled employee to a different job, if it 
is not feasible to accommodate a disabled employee in his existing position.4 Many of these 
accommodations negatively affect other employees; often, the most significant effect occurs 
when a disabled employee gets reassigned to another position when other non-disabled 
employees are interested in the same position. Yet, without the accommodation, the disabled 
employee would be out of a job, suffering the devastating consequences of unemployment. 
 This Article will attempt to resolve this conflict by amending the ADA to clearly define 
when an employer is obligated to accommodate a disabled employee even though the 
accommodation conflicts with the rights of other employees. The amendment would add a 
 
2 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. 
3 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A). 
4 42 U.S.C. 12111(9). 
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statement to the reasonable accommodation provision,5 stating: “An accommodation of last 
resort6 should not be deemed unreasonable because of its effect on other employees or its 
violation of a seniority system or other neutral policy of an employer, UNLESS its provision 
would result in the involuntary termination of another employee.”  
Part I of this Article will provide the reader with a background of the ADA and will 
frame the history of the debate over the proper interpretation of the reasonable accommodation 
provision. This debate culminated in the Supreme Court’s only decision thus far to address the 
scope of the reasonable accommodation provision. The case, U.S. Airways v. Barnett,7 also will 
be discussed in Part I.  Part II will demonstrate that both the legislative history and the statutory 
language of the ADA support my conclusion that the Court erred in adopting its rule in Barnett.
Part III will outline the proposed statutory amendment, as well as discuss the rationale for 
drafting the amendment as it is drafted.   
Part IV will outline the normative justifications for this proposal, including: (1) the 
amendment helps to achieve equal opportunity for disabled individuals; (2) the amendment 
provides guidance to employers and courts when forced to resolve the conflict between disabled 
employees and their co-workers; and (3) this proposal can be justified by drawing on well-
accepted Title VII jurisprudence. Finally, Part V will address the anticipated criticisms of this 
proposal. I will respond to two main criticisms: (1) the argument that this proposal will increase 
the backlash against the ADA; and (2) the criticism that the proposal is unfair because it requires 
employees to bear some of the burden of accommodation instead of forcing the employer to bear 
the entire cost of accommodation. This Article will demonstrate that this proposed amendment is 
 
5 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A). 
6 Accommodation of last resort simply means that the employer and employee have explored and dismissed the 
possibility of other accommodations; accordingly, the accommodation at issue is the last possible accommodation. If 
it is not granted, termination will most likely result. 
7 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
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not only necessary to resolve the conflict between disabled employees and their co-workers but 
that the burden placed on other employees in the workplace is a reasonable one.  
I. THE CONFLICT: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS THAT AFFECT OTHER EMPLOYEES.
A. The ADA’s Provisions 
Unlike other anti-discrimination statutes (such as Title VII) that protect individuals 
regardless of their sex, race or national origin, the ADA defines very narrowly the class of 
persons who can sue under the statute. In order to state a prima facie claim of discrimination, a 
plaintiff must prove that she is disabled, which is defined as follows: “(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”8 This 
provision is significant not only because it narrows the number of individuals who can claim 
they have a disability but also because it precludes a “reverse discrimination” lawsuit. A non-
disabled person cannot sue under the ADA, claiming that he was treated worse than the 
employee with a disability.9
The other unique provision of the ADA is its reasonable accommodation provision.  
Courts and scholars have long recognized that in order for individuals with disabilities to be 
afforded the same opportunities as non-disabled individuals, occasionally the disabled 
individuals must be treated differently.10 A simple illustration will suffice. Assume a person uses 
a wheelchair and seeks a job in an office building. Other, non-disabled applicants also seek the 
same job with the same employer. The applicant with the disability might have the same 
credentials as the non-disabled applicant, but unless the building is accessible for his wheelchair, 
 
8 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
9 RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM, THE FIRST DECADE OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT  97-99 
(New York University Press 2005). 
10 Linda Hamilton Krieger, Introduction, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA , 3 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., The 
University of Michigan Press  2003); Carlos Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodations Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 955 (2004). 
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he will not even get his foot in the door, literally or figuratively. Accordingly, the ADA drafters 
sensibly decided that the disabled community could only have the same opportunity to compete 
for, and work in, the same jobs as non-disabled employees if there was a mechanism to put 
disabled individuals on an equal playing field with non-disabled individuals.11 That mechanism 
is the reasonable accommodation provision.  
The ADA states that it is unlawful for employers to discriminate against individuals with 
disabilities and that the term discriminate includes:  
(5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an 
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business 
of such covered entity;12 
Not only did Congress prohibit the failure to accommodate, but it also defined the term 
“reasonable accommodation” to include:  
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable 
by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified 
work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, 
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, 
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.13 
The only statutory limitation to an employer’s duty to accommodate is that the accommodation 
cannot pose an undue hardship on the employer.14 The statute defines undue hardship as “an 
action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth 
in subparagraph (B).”15 
11 Carlos Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 955 (2004)  
12 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). 
14 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10). These factors will be discussed infra Part II. 
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The legislative history provides some guidance on the scope of the reasonable 
accommodation provision. The history states that the reasonable accommodation provision is 
“central to the non-discrimination mandate of the ADA.”16 Also indicated in the legislative 
history is that an employer can choose between various effective accommodations and does not 
have to automatically provide the preferred accommodation requested by the employee.17 This 
limitation gives meaning to the concept of “accommodation of last resort.” Because an employer 
does not have to provide an employee his preferred accommodation, the employer is always free 
to choose the least onerous accommodation, as long as it is an effective accommodation.18 For 
instance, the employer is free to choose other accommodations that allow the employee to work 
in his current job before it considers reassignment.19 The employer is only required to consider 
the reassignment accommodation when an employer is unable or unwilling to accommodate the 
employee in his current job.20 
In addition to the legislative history, the EEOC’s guidelines are instructive regarding the 
scope of the reasonable accommodation provision under the ADA, specifically the reassignment 
accommodation.21 First, reassigning an individual with a disability is only required for current 
 
16 Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, Serial Number 102-A, Vol. 1, 479 (1990). 
17 Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, at 480; Chai R. Feldblum, Americans with Disabilities Act: Selected 
Employment Requirements, Q217 ALI-ABA 29, 65 (1992).  
18 Id.; Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1996). 
19 Feldblum, supra note __, at 61; Hankins, 84 F.3d at 800. 
20 Feldblum, supra note __, at 63. 
21 Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act:  
Answers, Questions, and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 941–42 
(2003). These include: formal regulations, 29 C.F.R. §1630.1-1630.16; The Interpretive Guidance of Title I, 29 
C.F.R. app. §1630.2(o) (2003); The Technical Assistance Manual, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, A 
Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act §10.3 
(1992); EEOC No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the 
American with Disabilities Act (herein after Enforcement Guidance). 
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employees, not applicants.22 Second, employers should only consider reassignment if there are 
no other accommodations available that would allow the employee to perform her current job.23 
Third, a disabled employee only has a right to a truly vacant position. Accordingly, an employer 
is not required to bump another employee out of a job, nor is an employer required to create a job 
for the employee with the disability.24 Fourth, an employer is not required to transfer a disabled 
employee if he is not qualified for the vacant position. But according to the EEOC, an employer 
is required to transfer an employee to a vacant position as long as that employee is qualified.25 In 
other words, only allowing the employee to compete for the vacant position is not an 
accommodation according to the EEOC.26 
B. The Conflict 
 The conflict discussed in this Article arises because almost all accommodations given to 
disabled employees affect other non-disabled employees. For instance, if an employer 
accommodates an employee’s disability by not requiring the employee to lift anything over 30 
pounds, other employees might be required to do more than their fair share of lifting to get the 
job done. An employer’s accommodation of a disability precluding night shift work or requiring 
a set schedule or part-time schedule might require non-disabled employees to work less desirable 
shifts more often. Even offering a disabled employee a leave of absence in order to allow him to 
heal from a major surgery might mean other employees have to work harder or longer to make 
up the difference. Finally, giving a disabled employee a transfer to a vacant position might mean 
 
22 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2005). It would seem this would not even need to be stated, since logically, an 
employer cannot reassign someone who is not yet working.  It would also seem that if a disabled applicant realized 
that a particular position required job duties that he was unable to perform that he could simply apply for a job he 
could perform. 
23 Enforcement Guidance ¶ 6908 at 5453; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2005); Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. 
Rice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 759, 779 
(1992). 
24 ADA Title I EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app §1630.2(a); Enforcement Guidance ¶ 6908 at 5453. 
25 This would, of course, be subject to the undue hardship limitation. 
26 See Befort, Arizona, supra note __, at 943–44 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance). 
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that a non-disabled employee has to forego the opportunity to transfer into the same position. It 
is this conflict that is most often discussed by courts and scholars. 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in US Airways v. Barnett, lower courts primarily 
discussed the conflict between employees with disabilities and those without in the context of a 
reassignment accommodation that violated the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 
The majority of cases decided pre-Barnett adhered to a per se rule that the ADA does not require 
employers to violate an applicable seniority provision in a collective bargaining agreement to 
comply with the ADA’s reassignment provision.27 
However, a few courts have rejected the per se rule regarding collective bargaining 
agreements and accommodations.  For instance, in 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia rejected the per se rule and adopted a balancing approach to resolve the 
employee’s reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA, though the judgment was later 
vacated.28 The Ninth Circuit in Barnett v. US Airways, Inc. did an about face from its earlier “per 
se rule” holdings, when it held that the presence of a seniority system was merely “a factor in the 
undue hardship analysis.”29 Of course, Barnett was different in that its seniority system was 
unilaterally imposed by the employer, rather than the product of a collective bargaining 
 
27 Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 
F.3d 800, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1997) ; Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Cochrum v. 
Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1996); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997); Lujan v. 
Pacific Maritime Assoc., 165 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1999); Willis v. Pacific Maritime Assoc., 236 F.3d 1160, 1160 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
28 Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 116 F.3d 876, 894–95 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh’g en banc granted and judgment 
vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  The first appellate decision in this case held that the district court erred in 
resting its dismissal of Aka’s “reasonable accommodation” claim on the conclusion that any collective bargaining 
agreement bars the disabled employee from claiming an entitlement to an accommodation under the ADA.  The 
court in this case found the fact that a requested accommodation does not fall squarely within the terms of the 
applicable collective bargaining agreement is relevant only insofar as it undermines the employee’s claim that the 
accommodation is reasonable or strengthens the employer’s affirmative defense that the accommodation could not 
be provided without undue hardship. Id. 
29 Barnett v. US Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000); but see Foreman, 117 F.3d 809-10; Cochrum, 
102 F.3d 912-13; Eckles, 94 F.3d 1051; Benson, 62 F.3d 1114 (all following the per se rule that the ADA does not 
require employers to violate an applicable seniority provision of a collective bargaining agreement). 
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agreement.30 The court held that a “case-by-case fact intensive analysis is required to determine 
whether any particular reassignment would constitute an undue hardship to the employer.”31 
Scholars also disagreed about the proper scope of the reassignment accommodation. As 
was true in the courts, much of the debate centered on how to handle the situation where a 
disabled employee needed to transfer to a vacant position as the last resort but other employees 
had either superior seniority or qualifications.32 When the conflict involved a more qualified 
non-disabled employee, some scholars argued that the duty to accommodate should require an 
employer to give the vacant position to the individual with the disability as a reasonable 
accommodation.33 They argued that the ADA’s central goal of enabling individuals with 
disabilities to remain in the “economic and social mainstream of American life” will not be 
accomplished without the transfer, because the disabled employee would no longer have a job.34 
Other scholars, however, argued that requiring an employer to put the disabled employee in the 
vacant position when there are better-qualified candidates goes far beyond the intent of the ADA 
by creating preferences for disabled employees.35 
Scholarly debate also surrounded the treatment of collectively bargained seniority 
systems. Some scholars argued that the ADA does not support the per se rule adopted by courts 
that the reassignment provision should never force an employer to violate seniority rights under a 
 
30 Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1118. 
31 Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120. 
32 See Jeffrey Berenholz, The Development of Reassignment to a Vacant Position in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 635, 653 (1998); Estella J. Shoen, Does the ADA Make Exceptions in a 
Unionized Workplace? The Conflict Between the Reassignment Provisions of the ADA and Collectively Bargained 
Seniority Systems, 82 MINN. L.R. 1391, 1391-1393, 1401-24 (1998); Stephen F. Befort and Tracey Homes Donesky,
Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or 
Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1045, 1064-73 (2000). 
33 Befort and Donesky, supra note __, at 1088; Schoen, supra note __, at 1420-21.  
34 Befort and Donesky, supra note __, at 1088-89. 
35 Jennifer Beale, Affirmative Action and Violation of Union Contracts: The EEOC’s New Requirements Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 811, 821 (2002); Thomas F. O’Neil III and Kenneth M. Reiss, 
Reassigning Disabled Employees Under the ADA: Preferences Under the Guise of Equality?, 17 LAB. LAW. 347, 
350-51 (2001). 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION. 
 
10
collective bargaining agreement. These scholars believe that the per se approach substantially 
weakens the ADA and violates its intent by making it easier to keep disabled individuals out of 
the workforce instead of eliminating discrimination.36 Scholars at the other end of the spectrum 
favored the per se rule because they believe that a balancing or case-by-case approach to these 
conflicts would leave employers too vulnerable to the threat of litigation.37 These debates 
culminated in the Barnett case. 
C. The Barnett Case   
 In U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the plaintiff Robert Barnett was employed as a cargo handler 
when he injured his back on the job. His injury precluded him from carrying out some of the 
functions of his job as a cargo handler.38 Accordingly, he used his seniority under US Airways’ 
voluntary and unilaterally imposed seniority system (i.e., not a seniority system bargained for 
under a collective bargaining agreement) to transfer to a position in the mailroom, which he 
could perform even with the limitations caused by his back impairment.39 After Barnett spent 
two years in that position, the company made the decision to open the position to seniority 
bidding and at least two other employees, both with more seniority than Barnett, expressed 
interest in the mailroom position.40 Barnett asked his employer to allow him to remain in the 
position as a reasonable accommodation for his back disability. The company considered this 
 
36 Schoen, supra note __, at 1410; Judith Fornalik, Reasonable Accommodations and Collective Bargaining 
Agreements: A Continuing Dispute, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 117, 140-41 (1999); Robert A. Dubault, The ADA and the 
NLRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L. J. 1271, 1295-96 (1995) (proposing a balancing 
approach to the conflict between the ADA and the NLRA when a disabled employee requests an accommodation); 
Barbara Kamenir Frankel, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, 22 SW U.L. REV. 257, 260 (1992). 
37 O’Neil and Reiss, supra note __, at 358; Condon McGlothen & Gary Savine, Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.: 
Reconciling the ADA with Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is This the Correct Approach?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
1043, 1044 (1997).  
38 Id. at 394. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.
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request, but eventually denied it, and allowed one of the employees with more seniority to 
transfer into the position, resulting in Barnett’s termination.41 
As noted above, there was disagreement among courts and scholars regarding whose 
interests should trump—the rights of the employee with a disability under the ADA or the rights 
of other, non-disabled employees under a seniority system.42 The Supreme Court decided this 
issue in favor of the non-disabled employees, holding that, in the majority of cases, a request for 
a reasonable accommodation should not trump the provisions of a seniority system, regardless of 
whether the employer is bound to the seniority system by contract (through a collective 
bargaining agreement negotiated with a union) or has full authority to change the seniority 
system at will (as in Barnett).43 The court did state that a plaintiff could present evidence of 
special circumstances making a seniority rule exception reasonable, thus defeating an employer’s 
demand for summary judgment.44 
In addition to its discussion of the ultimate holding in the case, the Court also addressed 
the appropriate burden of proof. The Court held that a plaintiff only needs to show that an 
accommodation seems reasonable on its face, and then the employer has the burden of showing 
that the accommodation would cause an undue hardship.45 While one might think that this case 
would have turned on the undue hardship provision, thereby placing the burden on the employer, 
the Court held otherwise.46 
41 Id. 
42 Carlos Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 956 (2004) (discussing the different sides taken by the appellate courts). 
43Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 402. 
46 Id. This is pure speculation of course, but it seems likely that the Court did not want the decision to turn on the 
undue hardship analysis, because that term is specifically defined in the statute, where the term “reasonable” can be 
subject to many different interpretations.  
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The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that a proposed accommodation is not 
reasonable if it violates a seniority system, and the ADA does not require case-by-case proof that 
the seniority system should prevail.47 The Court cited several reasons to support this conclusion, 
including the importance of seniority systems to employee-management relations, the fact that 
seniority systems under collective bargaining agreements trump a requested reasonable 
accommodation in the context of the linguistically similar Rehabilitation Act,48 and the fact that 
several circuit courts have reached similar conclusions.49 The Court noted that “the relevant 
seniority system advantages, and related difficulties that result from violations of seniority rules, 
are not limited to collectively bargained systems.”50 
The Court’s final argument in support of its holding was that nothing in the ADA 
suggests that Congress intended to undermine seniority systems.51 The Court stated that 
seniority systems were created to ensure consistent, uniform treatment of employees and their 
success depends on these expectations.52 Because requiring an employer to show more than 
simply the existence of a seniority system would undermine the seniority system’s very purpose, 
the Court held that an employer is ordinarily only required to point to the existence of a seniority 
system to have summary judgment awarded in its favor.53 As stated earlier, the Court did note 
that a plaintiff is free to show special circumstances to prove that the requested accommodation, 
based on the particular facts, is reasonable despite a seniority system.54 The plaintiff has the 
 
47 Id. at 403. 
48 The Court’s comparison to the Rehabilitation Act is misplaced because the Rehabilitation Act did not contain 
reassignment as a possible accommodation, while the ADA does. Infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
49 Id. at 403.   
50 Id. at 403. 
51 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404–05. This is a conclusion with which I completely disagree, as will be discussed below. 
52 Id. at 404. 
53 Id. at 405. 
54 Id. 
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burden in this regard and must explain why an exception to the seniority system would constitute 
a reasonable accommodation.55 
Barnett was not a unanimous opinion. Justices Stevens and O’Connor joined Justice 
Breyer’s majority opinion, but both wrote separate concurring opinions. Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.56 While Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion adds little, Justice 
O’Connor argued that the inquiry should turn on whether the seniority system is legally 
enforceable.57 However, she realized her separate opinion would have led to a failure of the 
Court to arrive at a resolution of the case, so she signed on to the majority’s opinion.58 
Justice Scalia’s dissent criticized both the uncertainty resulting from the majority’s test, 
and what he believes is a mistaken interpretation of the ADA. In his view, the accommodation 
provision only requires “suspension (within reason) of those employment rules and practices that 
the employee’s disability prevents him from observing.”59 Justice Scalia believes that the only 
accommodations that are required are ones to remove a barrier that burdens a disabled person 
because of his disability. Because, in his view, neutral policies and practices burden everyone 
equally, accommodations in the form of preferential treatment are not required.60 
On the other hand, Justice Souter’s dissent argued that nothing in the ADA insulates 
seniority rules from the reasonable accommodation requirement. He argued that the legislative 
history of the ADA makes clear that there was no intention to carve out an exception for 
 
55 Id. at 406.  The Court provides a non-exhaustive list of examples when an employee could show that an 
accommodation would be reasonable despite a seniority system: the employer has retained the right to change the 
seniority system unilaterally and exercises that right frequently or the system already contains exceptions and that 
one further exception is unlikely to matter.  Id. at 405. 
56 Id. at 393. 
57 Id. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
58 Id. at 408. 
59 Id. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
60 Id. at 413. 
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seniority systems.61 Justice Souter also emphasized the fact that Barnett was already in the 
mailroom position and that US Airways had full authority to not classify the mailroom position 
as vacant in the first place.62 
The majority decision in Barnett is troubling because it will lead to the termination of 
more productive employees with disabilities. Not only does this have consequences to the 
disabled employee and his family, but it also has negative consequences to the employer, who is 
losing a valuable employee, and to society, who might have to bear the cost of supporting the 
disabled employee if he is unable to find another job. Not only is the Barnett decision troubling 
from a normative perspective, but it is also doctrinally wrong, as evidenced by the statutory 
construction and legislative history.  
II. THE ERROR OF BARNETT 
Regardless of how Barnett is interpreted, it falls short of Congress’ goal of equal 
opportunity for individuals with disabilities. This Part will argue that both the expansive view 
and the narrow view of Barnett are erroneous. 
 A. An Expansive View of Barnett 
 Some scholars have argued that Barnett is not limited to cases where an accommodation 
violates a seniority system.63 In fact, Cheryl Anderson believes that a broad reading of Barnett 
could lead to the conclusion that the Court has developed a “neutral policy presumption,” 
whereby any accommodation that violates a neutral rule is presumptively unreasonable.64  This, 
she correctly believes, would turn the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision on its head 
 
61 Id. at 420-22 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. at 423. 
63 Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and the ADA: The Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett 
Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2002). Several lawyers, giving advice to clients in the 
aftermath of Barnett were uncertain of its breadth. Need cites. 
64 Id.
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION. 
 
15
because most accommodations are a deviation from a neutral policy rule.65 She also is concerned 
(rightfully so) that Barnett will make it harder for disabled employees to get accommodations 
when those accommodations affect other employees.66 If Barnett could be read broadly to 
prohibit all accommodations that have a negative effect on other employees or otherwise violate 
a neutral rule,67 the statutory language of the ADA flatly contradicts that rule. 
 As noted in Part I, several accommodations are mentioned in the statutory language of 
the ADA itself.68 The only limitation to the reasonable accommodation provision mentioned in 
the statute itself is the “undue hardship” defense.69 The statute lists several factors that courts 
should consider in deciding if a proposed accommodation creates an undue burden. They are:  
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Chapter; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the 
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at 
such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of 
such accommodation under the operation of the facility;  
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the 
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees, the 
number, type and the location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 
composition, structure, and functions of such entity; the geographic separateness, 
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the 
covered entity.70 
Notably absent from this list is “the effect such an accommodation has on other employees in the 
workforce.”  Certainly this omission is not inadvertent.  Congress had to know when drafting the 
ADA, that some (if not most) accommodations would affect other employees and that those 
 
65 Id. at 37. 
66 Id. at 41. 
67 For a decision applying the Barnett rule beyond the reassignment accommodation, see Shields v. BCI Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of LA, 2005 WL 2045887 (W.D. Wash, Aug. 25) (denying an accommodation for day shift work and 
limited overtime because of seniority system). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION. 
 
16
employees might feel that the accommodation gives an unfair advantage to the employee with 
the disability.71 
Yet despite Congress’s knowledge that many reasonable accommodations will burden 
other employees, Congress did not write an exception into the statute to protect non-disabled 
employees. It could have accomplished this in several different ways. First, Congress could have 
allowed a broader class of persons to bring a complaint alleging a violation of the ADA. In other 
words, as it stands now, only individuals with a disability (as that term is narrowly defined both 
in the statutory language itself and even more so by the courts) can bring a claim under the 
ADA.72 A non-disabled person cannot bring a reverse discrimination suit under the ADA, 
claiming that someone with a disability was treated better than he was. 73 If Congress was 
worried about the effects accommodations might have on other employees, it could have 
broadened the protected class to include everyone. For instance, it simply could have added 
“disability” as a protected category under Title VII, but it did not. It chose to draft a very specific 
statute with a provision not seen in traditional discrimination law.  Accordingly, it must have 
presumed that some non-disabled employees would be affected by some accommodations, yet it 
chose not to give them a remedy.  
 Another, less drastic way Congress could have acknowledged the effects of 
accommodations on other employees is by limiting the definition of reasonable accommodation. 
 
71 See Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, at 480 (commenting that unlike other civil rights laws, the ADA 
would impose costs on others). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining qualified individual with a disability) and § 12112(a) (stating that no employer can 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability); COLKER, supra note __, at 18, 97–99. For cases that 
have limited the definition of disability, see Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,482-83 (1999); Murphy v. 
UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 525 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564-65 (1999); Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002). 
73 COLKER, supra note __, at  97–99; Ball, supra note __, at 981 (arguing that critics of affirmative action like to 
refer to the reasonable accommodation provision as reverse discrimination that benefits minorities at other’s 
expense. This criticism is not applicable to reasonable accommodation cases because preferential treatment is 
required by law); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN 
FEDERAL COURT, 43 (2005). 
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For instance, Congress could have stated: “An accommodation that has a significant effect on 
other employees is not reasonable.”  Similarly, it could have included the effect on other 
employees as a factor under the undue hardship provision. Again, it chose not to. Accordingly, it 
is safe to assume that Congress considered the interests of the non-disabled, and chose to protect 
disabled individuals instead. 
 B. Narrow View of Barnett 
 Even if we assume that Barnett is limited to conflicts under seniority systems and 
reassignment to vacant positions,74 there is no statutory support for such a limitation. There is 
absolutely nothing in the ADA’s legislative history to support the Court’s holding in Barnett.75 
In fact, the legislative history suggests the opposite—that Congress intended the obligation to 
transfer a disabled employee to a vacant position to be a very broad one.76 In one of the Senate 
Reports, it states:  
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a vacant position.  
If, an employee, because of his disability, can no longer perform the essential 
functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to a vacant job for which the 
person is qualified may prevent the employee from being out of work and the 
employer from losing a valuable worker.77 
The Report also contains language supporting the EEOC’s position that reassignment is not 
available to applicants, that efforts should be made to accommodate in the employee’s current 
 
74 There is some argument that Barnett is not so limited. Supra notes __ and accompanying text.  
75 Rebecca Pirius, “Seniority Rules”: Disabled Employees’ Rights Under the ADA Give Way To More Senior 
Employees – U.S. Airways v. Barnett,29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1481,1499 (2003). (arguing that the Court’s ruling 
in Barnett ignores the legislative history regarding the effect of seniority systems under the ADA). Some would 
argue that there is little sense in referring to legislative history because it cannot possibly represent what Congress 
thought. COLKER, supra note __, at 208 (quoting Justice Scalia, referring to the “fairyland in which legislative 
history reflects what was in Congress’s mind”). 
76 Cf. COLKER, supra note __, at 23 (stating that courts have generally ignored the legislative history of the ADA and 
have thus interpreted the statute very narrowly). 
77 S. REP. NO. 101–116, at 31–32 (1989). 
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position before transferring the employee, and that reassignment is only possible to a vacant 
position—no bumping is required.78 
As stated earlier, it would have been easy for Congress to add a limitation under the 
reasonable accommodation provision or undue hardship provision, precluding an 
accommodation that would cause an employer to violate a seniority system, whether that system 
was one derived through collective bargaining or unilaterally imposed by the employer. Other 
commentators have criticized the Barnett decision, pointing out that there is no seniority system 
defense in the text of the ADA.79 In fact, such an exception was deliberately left out because 
seniority systems, virtually always established by the nondisabled constituencies, were viewed as 
part of the problem the ADA was designed to address.80 
While the Senate Report discusses collective bargaining agreements, it does not mention 
seniority systems that are not implemented through a contract—such as the unilaterally imposed 
one in Barnett.81 Even with respect to collective bargaining agreements, the history follows the 
regulations promulgated under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act—that an employer’s 
obligation to comply with the Act is not affected by any inconsistent term of any collective 
bargaining agreement to which it is a party.”82 
The legislative history does state that a collective bargaining agreement could be relevant 
in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable. It states: “[I]f a collective bargaining 
agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be 
 
78 S. REP. NO. 101–116 at 32. 
79 E.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 340, 350; see also Matthew 
B. Robinson, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation vs. Seniority in the Application of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 179, 204 (2003).  (noting that both the “House and the Senate Reports contain 
language to the effect that seniority policies are but one factor in determining whether an accommodation of a 
disabled employee would be a reasonable accommodation.”). 
80 S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 29.  
81 S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32. 
82 Id. at 32 (stating that an employer cannot use a collective bargaining agreement to accomplish what it would 
otherwise be prohibited from doing). 
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considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an 
employee with a disability without seniority to that job.”83 This sentence is the only arguably 
relevant language in the legislative history and yet it does more to undermine the Supreme 
Court’s position in Barnett than to support it, for several reasons. First, the mailroom position in 
Barnett was not reserved for someone with more seniority than Barnett.  Barnett had enough 
seniority for the job—there was simply someone who had more seniority than he did. Second, 
the comparative lack of seniority is simply one factor to be considered, and could presumably be 
outweighed by other factors—such as the fact that the employee stood to lose his job without the 
transfer. In fact, in discussing the effect of collective bargaining agreements, the House Report 
also states: “The [collective bargaining] agreement would not be determinative on the issue.”84 
Third, and perhaps more importantly, the situation in Barnett did not involve a collective 
bargaining agreement.85 Violating a collective bargaining agreement through the provision of an 
accommodation could be relevant to the undue hardship analysis because an employer could be 
financially liable to the non-disabled employee for breaching the collective bargaining 
agreement.86 However, in the situation in Barnett, with a unilaterally imposed and modifiable at 
will seniority system, the threat of litigation by the non-disabled employees is slim, at best.87 
83 Id. at 32. 
84 H.R. REP. NO. 101–485 at 63 (1990); see also Christopher and Rice, supra note __, at 781 (noting that a collective 
bargaining agreement is not dispositive of the issue, and suggesting that if the transfer is the only accommodation, it 
might need to be provided even despite a collective bargaining agreement to the contrary). This is significant 
because under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, courts were automatically deferring to the collective bargaining 
agreements but under the ADA, Congress rejected that automatic deference. Feldblum, supra note _, at 68. 
85 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 392. 
86 This is the position taken by Professor Stephen Befort, in his article, Reasonable Accommodation and 
Reassignment Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions & Suggested Solutions After U.S. 
Airways v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV 931 (2003). He argues that the courts should focus on the undue hardship 
analysis, rather than the reasonableness factor. Id. at 982. Befort suggests this proposal because he believes most 
transfer policies are enacted for the benefit of the employer, not the employees. Id. at 980. Accordingly, under the 
undue hardship analysis, if a non-disabled employee has a legal entitlement to a vacant position under such a 
system, then reassignment would be inappropriate. Id. at 981. 
87 Supra notes __ and accompanying text.  
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Fourth, that statement quoted above (regarding the collective bargaining agreement as a 
factor), is qualified by a statement in the same report that “Conflicts between provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement and an employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations 
may be avoided by ensuring that agreements negotiated after the effective date of this title 
contain a provision permitting the employer to take all actions necessary to comply with this 
legislation.”88 Because Congress believed that employers and unions should negotiate their 
collective bargaining agreements to allow for accommodations under the ADA, it certainly 
seems that a unilaterally imposed seniority system should contain a provision allowing for 
accommodations under the ADA.  Because Congress discussed in some detail collective 
bargaining agreements, the absence of any mention of the issue in Barnett—seniority systems 
that are unilaterally imposed—speaks volumes.89 
Finally, the lack of a statutory exemption for seniority systems of any type (collectively 
bargained or unilaterally imposed) is another clear signal that Congress did not intend the result 
in Barnett. When drafting the ADA, Congress relied in part on the anti-discrimination provisions 
of Title VII,90 which contains a statutory exemption for seniority systems that states: 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . .”91 
88 S. REP. NO 101–116 at 32.  
89 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that because Congress did not protect collectively 
bargained seniority systems, surely it could not have intended greater protection for unilateral ones). 
90 See, e.g., Pirius, supra note __, at 1483–84 (citing to language in Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403). 
91 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h). 
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Because Congress was most certainly aware of the seniority system protection in Title VII, its 
omission of such a provision in the ADA is very significant.92 
Accordingly, the Barnett Court erred by holding that seniority systems trump an 
employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations.93 Not only did Congress not 
contemplate carving out such an exception, but also logically, it does not make sense. The main 
argument one can make in support of treating seniority systems differently is that they have an 
effect on other employees, in that the non-disabled employees have expectations to be treated in 
accordance with the rules of the seniority system.  However, most accommodations have an 
effect on other employees; some effects are just more subtle.94 For instance, accommodating an 
employee with a night vision impairment by giving him the day shift would require other 
employees to work the less desirable night shift more often.95 Accommodating an employee with 
a lifting restriction might mean that a non-disabled employee has to do more than his fair share 
of the heavy lifting. Providing a leave of absence to a disabled employee might necessitate other 
employees working longer hours or working harder to make up the difference.96 And of course, 
allowing a disabled employee to transfer to a vacant position might affect another employee who 
wanted that same position.  Yet all of these accommodations are mentioned as possible 
 
92 See, e.g., Pirius, supra note __, at 1482–83 (stating that, inapposite from Title VII, Congress decided to limit the 
deference afforded to seniority systems and collective bargaining agreements under the ADA); MEZEY, supra note 
__, at 62; Barnett, 535 U.S. at 420-21 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Because Congress modeled several of the ADA’s 
provisions on Title VII, its failure to replicate Title VII’s exemption for seniority systems leaves the statute 
ambiguous, albeit with more than a hint that seniority rules do not inevitably carry the day.”). 
93 Cf. Seth Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: US Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the 
Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123, 180-185 (2003) (arguing that the Barnett 
decision needed further analysis to see if the seniority system provided enough benefit to outweigh the disadvantage 
of violating the seniority system by accommodating the employee with a disability).  
94 See Anderson, supra note __, at 37–38 (arguing that the Barnett decision will hurt other employees with 
disabilities because many other accommodations affect other employees). 
95 But see LaResca v. American Tel. & Tel., 161 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that an employer was not 
obligated to accommodate the day shift preference of an employee with a seizure disorder who could not drive at 
night). 
96 Long, supra note __, at 870–71. 
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accommodations under the ADA.97 It is non-sensical to assume that Congress would put 
limitations on some of the listed accommodations but not all of them.  Accordingly, the Court’s 
opinion in Barnett, which announced a separate rule for reassignments, is simply incorrect. 
The Court in Barnett also based its decision to protect seniority systems on the 
“linguistically similar” Rehabilitation Act.98 However, this reliance is misplaced because the 
reassignment accommodation was not included in the regulations implementing the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.99 While most accommodations are taken from §504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, reassignment is new to the ADA.100 Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts 
were divided as to whether reassignment was a reasonable accommodation. Congress decided to 
clear up the confusion by explicitly listing it as an accommodation, yet because of the concerns 
of employers, added language that reassignment is only appropriate to a “vacant” position.101 
This fact leads to the reasonable inference that Congress had some concern for other employees; 
they should not be bumped out of their job in order to make way for an employee with a 
disability.102 However, Congress did not put any further limitation on the reassignment 
accommodation. It very easily could have listed reassignment to a vacant position as a potential 
 
97 42 U.S.C § 12111(9). 
98 Barnett, 535 U.S. at  403-404  
99 Feldblum, supra note __, at 63–64; Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YAL L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 297 
(2005) (stating that prior to the passage of the ADA, reassignment to another position was generally not considered a 
reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act) (citations omitted); Befort, Arizona, supra note __, at 944; 
Sarah Shaw, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use Available Mitigating 
Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1981, 2046, n. 25 (2002) (citations omitted); Andrikopoulos & 
Gould, Note, Living in Harmony? Reasonable Accommodations, Employee Expectations and US Airways v. Barnett, 
20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 363-64 (2003)  (arguing that the Barnett court erred in relying on Rehabilitation 
Act precedent, because there are differences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, most notably the 
provision of the “reassignment” accommodation under the ADA, yet not under the Rehabilitation Act); Alex Long, 
State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans With Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV.
597, 611–12 (2004) (stating that courts almost uniformly held that reassignment was not a required accommodation 
under the Rehabilitation Act); Befort, supra note __, at 449, 451–52 (discussing how prior to 1992, the 
Rehabilitation Act did not include a reassignment provision). 
100 Feldblum, supra note __, at 63. 
101 Id.
102 Id.
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accommodation and added the exception “unless another employee has superior seniority rights 
and/or is more qualified for the position.” It chose not to.  
III. ARRIVING AT AN AMENDMENT 
A. Other Scholarship on Barnett: Alex Long’s Proposal 
After Barnett was decided, several notes, comments and articles were written referencing 
the Barnett case. 103 While many of these pieces were critical of Barnett, few offered any 
concrete proposals for change and none of their analyses go far enough to solve the problems left 
by the Barnett decision.104 Some scholars have criticized the Barnett decision and suggest that 
the inquiry of whether an employer is obligated to transfer an employee to a vacant position 
when someone else has more seniority turns on the legitimacy of the co-worker’s expectations 
for uniform treatment under the seniority system.105 Others believe that the only limitation on the 
 
103 See, e.g., Alex B. Long, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent Third Parties,” 68 
MO. L. REV. 863 (2003) (agreeing with the result but not the reasoning of Barnett); Stephen J. Befort, The Most 
Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
439 (2002); Befort, Arizona, supra note _, at  967 (agreeing with the result in Barnett but suggesting a different test; 
Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans With Disabilities Act and Possibilities for 
Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 615 (2004).  Matthew B. Robinson, 
Comment, Reasonable Accommodation vs. Seniority in the Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 179 (2003) (disagreeing with the result in Barnett in part because of the legislative history of the 
ADA, as well as the fact that the risk to the employer of litigation by the non-disabled, non-transferred employee is 
minimal); Barbara L. Campbell, U.S. Airways v. Barnett: did the Supreme Court Further Cloud Rather Than Clarify 
the “Reasonable Accommodation” Requirement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, in Light of Barnett?, 28 
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 101 (2002) (criticizing the result in Barnett, in part because of its lack of clarity); Blake 
Sonne, Note, Employment Law: Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act vs. 
Employee Seniority Rights: Understanding the Real Conflict in U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 225 
(2004) (arguing that the decision was wrong because it gave disabled employees too much); Sandy Andrikopoulos 
& Theo E.M. Gould, Note, Living in Harmony? Reasonable Accommodations, Employee Expectations and US 
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345 (2003) (arguing that the Barnett decision was too 
ambiguous and suggesting that the reassignment decision should turn on whether the employer has reserved the right 
to make exceptions to seniority systems); Paul L. Nevin, Note, “No Longer in the Middle?”: Barnett Seniority 
System Ruling Eliminates Management’s Dilemma with Americans with Disabilities Act, Reasonable 
Accommodation, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2002) (undecided); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and 
the ADA: The Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2002) 
(disagreeing with the result in Barnett). 
104 The problems I am referring to are the fact that the Barnett decision results in the lawful termination of valuable employees 
with disabilities and the decision leaves quite a bit of uncertainty in its future applications. 
105 See, e.g., Andrikopoulos & Gould, supra note __, at 378; Befort, Arizona, supra note __, at  979-80.  
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duty to accommodate an employee with a disability is the undue hardship defense.106 Many 
scholars have criticized the approach taken by the majority in the Barnett case, but do not offer 
any reasonable alternative. One scholar, however, did offer a concrete proposal for change and 
his article warrants further discussion.  
In Professor Alex Long’s article, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation Requirement, 
and “Innocent Third Parties,”107 he attempts to provide a solution to the problem of an 
accommodation’s effect on other employees.108 Long focuses on how an employer’s duty to 
provide reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities affects “innocent” third 
parties, i.e., the co-employees of the disabled employee. He suggests that courts need to focus on 
how a reasonable accommodation might affect co-employees, but he criticizes other tests, 
including the Supreme Court’s approach in U.S. Airways v. Barnett.109 
Long correctly points out that the greatest conflict over reasonable accommodations is 
not the costs levied on employers but the negative effect accommodations might have on other 
employees.110 While he believes that many needed accommodations have no effect on co-
workers because they simply involve a cost to the employer, such as modifying the structural 
aspects of a disabled employee’s workplace,111 he then notes what has been emphasized here—
that many other accommodations have a more prominent effect on other employees. 
Regarding the most controversial accommodation, reassignment, Long acknowledges the 
severity of the impact on the disabled employee if he is denied reassignment, yet finds 
 
106 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note __, at 41-43. 
107 Long, supra note ___. 
108 Id.
109 Id. at 865–66. 
110 Long, supra note ___, at 869. 
111 Id. at 869. This analysis fails to take into account that money spent by the employer on a disabled employee is 
money that cannot be spent on other employees in terms of wage increases and other benefits. If one assumes that 
the employer will want the same profit, then the pot of money to spend on employees necessarily decreases when an 
employer is spending money on a reasonable accommodation for a disabled employee.  
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significance in the harm to the non-disabled employees if the employee with the disability is 
accommodated. He states: 
As reassignment is the accommodation of last resort, if a disabled employee is 
denied the vacancy, the employee will be out of a job and, because of his or her 
disability, may have difficulty obtaining a new job. If a better qualified employee 
is denied the vacancy, presumably he or she will still have a job, just not the job 
desired.  However, the impact on the better qualified employee could be more 
than de minimis. For whatever reason, the employee desired to move into the new 
position, so presumably the employee considered the vacant position to be an 
improvement over the employee’s current position. Moreover, the vacant position 
may objectively be an improvement over the current position even though it is not 
technically a promotion.112 
Long criticizes the courts’ approaches as a “standardless grab bag.”113 While Long 
believes that the majority’s opinion in Barnett reached the right result, he criticizes how the 
majority arrived at its opinion.114 He states that the focus of the majority’s opinion was on the 
other employees’ expectation of consistent, uniform treatment, and this focus provides little 
guidance to lower courts in cases not involving seniority rules. Instead, he argues, the court’s 
emphasis should be on the tangible effects such decisions have on other employees, rather than 
the effects of the accommodation on the expectations of consistent, uniform treatment of other 
employees.115 
In articulating his own test, Long first argues that Congress did not intend to remedy the 
problems of individuals with disabilities by requiring that employers take action that would 
cause other employees to suffer a materially adverse impact, although he recognizes that much of 
 
112 Id. at 884. 
113 Id. at 893. 
114 Id. at 896. 
115 Id. at 897. 
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the scholarship in this area takes exactly the opposite stance—that the non-contractual rights of 
other employees are of secondary importance to the interests of a disabled employee.116 
Based on his belief that the rights of non-disabled co-workers should not be ignored, Long 
proposed the following rule: that a proposed accommodation is not reasonable “when it would 
violate the contractual rights of another employee or otherwise result in an adverse employment 
action (as that term is defined through case law) for a non-disabled employee.”117 
B. Long’s Missing Link: Comparing the Consequences 
While Long’s approach makes sense from a doctrinal perspective (because it could be 
easily applied by using current case law) and seems to make sense from a fairness perspective 
(because it only denies disabled employees an accommodation if such accommodation would 
result in an adverse employment action for the other employees), it fails to take into account the 
relative degree of harm to the two parties.  As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in the 
Barnett case, if a disabled employee is denied an accommodation, he is out of a job, whereas the 
non-disabled employee who does not get the transfer still has his job.118 This disparity in 
consequences is troubling, and the fact that it can be accomplished despite the ADA’s clear goal 
of providing equal opportunity to the disabled is even more disturbing.  
Because of this disparity in consequences, I sought to develop a balancing test, which I 
refer to as the “comparative consequences test.” The idea of this test is to compare the 
consequences to the disabled employee if the accommodation is not granted with the 
consequences to the non-disabled employee if the accommodation is granted. However, when 
applying this test, one finds that the balancing test is rather a heavy-handed one, leading in most 
 
116 Id. at 898. I, of course, disagree with his assertion that Congress did not believe that eliminating discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities was more important than protecting non-disabled employees. Supra Part II. 
117 Long, supra note __, at 901. 
118 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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instances to requiring an accommodation. The reason for this result is that most accommodations 
that significantly affect other employees (like a reassignment accommodation) are 
“accommodations of last resort.” In other words, the employer has considered and dismissed all 
other potential accommodations that would allow the employee to remain in his current position 
and therefore has determined that reassignment is the only option left. If the reassignment 
accommodation is not given, termination will result.119 
Accordingly, the balancing test would only favor the non-disabled employee if an 
accommodation would lead to the non-disabled employee’s termination—admittedly, a relatively 
rare occurrence. Therefore, instead of suggesting Congress adopt a balancing test with its 
uncertainty and accompanying inefficiencies, this Article proposes a bright line rule that would 
be easy to apply and would most often reach the same result as the balancing test.120 
C. The Amendment 
 This proposed amendment would add language to the reasonable accommodation 
provision stating: “An accommodation of last resort should not be deemed unreasonable because 
of its effect on other employees or its violation of a seniority system or other neutral policy of an 
employer UNLESS its provision would result in the involuntary termination of another 
employee.” According to this amendment, a requested accommodation would be deemed 
unreasonable only if the accommodation would lead to the involuntary termination of the non-
disabled employee.121 
1.  Why Termination? 
 
119 It should be noted that if there is another accommodation that would not infringe (as much) on other employees’ 
interests, the employer is free to choose that accommodation, as an employer is not required to give a disabled 
employee his preferred accommodation, only a reasonable one. 
120 For a discussion on why it is fair to place the burden of accommodation on other employees, see infra part V.B. 
121 The reader should keep in mind that even if an acc is deemed reasonable pursuant to this amendment, the 
employer still has the opportunity to demonstrate that the acc creates an undue hardship. This might occur if the 
employer was subject to significant legal liability because the accommodation violates an employer’s contractual 
rights. 
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Application of this amendment would obviously lead to a different result in Barnett. Even 
though someone might consider a transfer extremely important, not getting the transfer but 
remaining employed is still less severe than the harm to the disabled employee if the 
accommodation is not granted (termination).122 At worst, the non-disabled transfer seeker can 
remain in his position until another position becomes vacant, while the worst-case scenario for 
the disabled employee is much more severe: loss of job.123 
In balancing the conflicting interests of the employees, the line is drawn at termination. 
The rationale for this decision is based on the severity of termination, as the workplace 
equivalent of “capital punishment.”124 Many people have their whole life identity wrapped up in 
their job and occupation. For them, termination means not only a loss of regular paychecks, but 
also means “dashed expectation as to future benefits, a loss of character and personal identity, 
 
122 Ball, supra note __, at 962 (noting that able-bodied employees get to remain employed without the transfer 
whereas the disabled employee would be out of a job). Professor Anderson also makes an argument similar to the 
one in this Article, that the other employees denied the transfer if it is given to the employee with a disability, are 
not harmed that much, because their attainment of a transfer is likely just delayed, rather than the consequences to 
the individual with a disability who is out of a job without an accommodation. Anderson, supra note __, at 42. As an 
aside, one could also argue that allowing the accommodation transfer is beneficial to the employer as well, because 
it saves the employer the administrative costs of replacing the employee with a disability. Such costs are estimated at 
$1,800-2,400, which is roughly 40 times the cost of the average accommodation. Peter David Blanck, The 
Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I—the Workplace 
Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 903 (1997). 
123 Befort, supra note __, at 982–83. 
Consider, in this regard, the respective fates of two employees—one disabled and one not—who 
each desire the same vacant position. If the disabled employee is denied the requested transfer, he 
or she is out of a job. Since reassignment is the accommodation of last resort, the opportunity to be 
placed in this vacant position represents the disabled employee’s “last chance” to remain 
employed with that particular employer. In contrast, the consequences suffered by the non-
disabled employee who does not obtain the desired transfer are less severe. The non-disabled 
worker remains employed in his or her current position, and the chance to move into a more 
desirable position is deferred rather than lost. Given this significant disparity in consequences, the 
scale generally should tip in favor of the disabled employee in the absence of a showing of an 
undue hardship. 
Id.
124 Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives No Longer Pertain: “Right 
Sizing” and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH L. REV. 276,  277-78 (2000); Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, 
Involuntary Separations, and Employment At-Will,  34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351,  353 (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN &
LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 910 (4th ed. 1998). 
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and the loss of the financial security one expected.”125 Another scholar has said this about 
termination: 
Dismissal affects a person’s economic, emotional, and physical health in ways 
unparalleled by less drastic forms of discipline or transitory interruptions of work. 
Not only does dismissal have immediate financial consequences for the 
discharged worker, it also has an economic impact into the future. . . . The loss of 
one’s job is felt not only by the individual worker but by members of his or her 
family and the community. . . . If the termination is the result of factors other than 
an employee’s conduct or performance, the loss can be devastating.126 
While some might argue that not getting a desired transfer (as in Barnett) is very serious, in the 
world of the workplace, most would agree that job security is the single most important factor for 
the vast majority of employees.  
While I recognize that Congress did not intend to protect non-disabled individuals under 
the ADA,127 fairness and justice, as well as a pragmatic concern that providing no protection to 
the non-disabled co-workers would result in increased hostility against disabled employees, leads 
me to the conclusion that an accommodation should not be given if it results in the termination of 
another employee. There is no faster way of ensuring hostility toward the disabled community 
than taking away job security of other employees, which is at the heart of the benefits sought by 
most employees. 
 2. Application and Limitations (Bumping) 
Generally, this rule would be easy to apply. There are some factual scenarios, however, 
that would not be so easily resolved. Suppose both a disabled and a non-disabled employee want 
a transfer to a vacant position and suppose the non-disabled employee has more seniority. We 
must also assume (for purposes of this example) that: the vacant position has different hours or 
more flexible hours than the current position in which the non-disabled employee is working; she 
 
125 Schmall, supra note __, at 278. 
126 Young, supra note __, at 353. 
127 Supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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is seeking the vacant job because it better suits her child care arrangements, and she has decided 
that if she does not get the position, she will quit her job and look for something more flexible. 
While this represents a close call,128 the scales would tip in favor of the disabled employee 
because termination would be voluntary for the non-disabled employee, whereas if the 
accommodation is not granted, termination for the disabled employee would be involuntary.  
Furthermore, it is likely more difficult for an individual with a disability to find a job than a non-
disabled employee.129 Finally, the employer has a legal obligation to accommodate the disabled 
employee and does not have a similar obligation with respect to the non-disabled employee.130 
Admittedly, under this proposed amendment, there are not many scenarios where the 
non-disabled employee’s interests would trump the interests of the disabled employee—I can 
imagine one.  Suppose an employer is preparing to engage in a mass layoff, and both the 
disabled employee and a non-disabled employee with more seniority attempt to transfer to 
another department that will not be affected by the lay-off. In this case, both employees are 
threatened with loss of their jobs and the rights of the disabled employee should not trump.131 
This proposed amendment would adhere to the statutory language of only allowing an 
accommodation to a “vacant” position.132 Accordingly, an employer would not be required to 
bump a non-disabled employee out of his position so that the disabled employee could have the 
 
128 This is an especially difficult issue for me to resolve because I care deeply about issues surrounding working 
mothers, and I think employers should offer more flexibility to working mothers. See, e.g., Nicole Porter, Re-
Defining Superwoman: An Essay on Overcoming the Maternal Wall in the Legal Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL. 55 (2006). Some have argued that the reasonable accommodation principle should apply to other contexts 
and it is my sincere hope that the ADA will result in employers realizing there are benefits to restructuring positions 
and other accommodations given to the disabled and that this will result in a willingness to expand these 
accommodations to non-disabled employees, including working mothers. 
129 Long, supra note __, at 884. 
130 If in fact the employer had a legal obligation to give the non-disabled employee the preferred shift (perhaps under 
an FMLA obligation) then the employer should give the schedule variance in the non-disabled employee’s current 
position. 
131 I recognize that the harm from termination is likely to be worse for the disabled employee because it likely will 
be more difficult for him to find a job. However, based on the severity of termination and the concern for hostility, 
this result is the correct one. 
132 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). 
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physically easier job, because presumably bumping an employee out of his job would result in 
that employee’s termination. There might be situations where an employer could force an 
employee out of his position to make room for a disabled employee, but then assign the 
displaced employee to another position of similar quality and pay. In this situation, one could 
argue that bumping a non-disabled employee does not lead to his termination and therefore, the 
proposed amendment should allow the bumping.  However, that result is unjustifiable for a 
couple of reasons.  
First, it would be directly contradictory to the statutory language of the ADA. While this 
Article has suggested an amendment to the ADA, the amendment is consistent with the 
legislative history and statutory language of the Act. In other words, it is this author’s belief that 
if Congress had given sufficient attention to the conflict between disabled employees and non-
disabled employees, it likely would have supported a result similar to the one this Article is 
advocating. On the other hand, Congress did give sufficient attention to the issue of bumping and 
decided that bumping would not be allowed.133 
A second justification for not allowing disabled employees to bump other employees can 
be gleaned from the endowment effect used by social scientists.134 Applying this theory lends 
support for my position that bumping an employee from his position is qualitatively worse than 
allowing a disabled employee to transfer to a vacant position ahead of a non-disabled employee. 
The endowment effect theorizes that individuals value entitlements they are in possession of 
 
133 The reasonable accommodation provision states that an appropriate accommodation might be “reassignment to a 
vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. §12111(9) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 101-116 at 31-32 (indicating that no 
bumping is required to transfer a disabled employee). 
134 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003). A disclaimer 
is needed. I am not a social scientist and this Article does not purport to undertake an in-depth analysis of the 
endowment effect.  Instead, I am merely using evidence of this effect to support what is very intuitive to me: that 
being bumped from your current job is substantively more unfair and troubling than not being allowed a transfer to a 
job you do not yet have. 
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more than ones they are not.135 A related theory, and perhaps one that is more relevant in this 
context, is the status quo bias, which theorizes that “individuals tend to prefer the present state of 
the world to alternative states, all other things being equal.”136 Researchers are not quite sure 
what causes the endowment effect, but one hypothesis is relevant here. It has been suggested that 
loss aversion is a cause of the endowment effect and that this loss aversion may occur because 
individuals form attachments to what they have.137 This seems especially true with jobs. Even 
despite our society’s increased mobility in the workforce, many individuals view even a 
voluntary job change with trepidation, and being forced from one’s job, even if placed in another 
position, would certainly increase that emotional response. Accordingly, the endowment effect 
explains the intuitive conclusion that bumping an employee from his job is worse than not 
allowing him to transfer into a new position because a disabled employee is placed in the new 
position instead.  
One might argue that allowing a disabled employee to transfer into a position ahead of a 
non-disabled employee with more seniority is taking away the seniority rights of the non-
disabled employee, to which he undoubtedly has a strong sense of entitlement. I do not disagree 
that employees operating under a seniority system have a strong interest in their competitive 
seniority within the company. Competitive seniority determines not only transfers but also 
dictates shifts, layoffs, and recall from layoffs.138 The more seniority an employee has, the more 
protection he has from being subject to a layoff.139 But this proposed amendment does not take 
away the non-disabled employee’s seniority and does not put the disabled employee ahead of the 
non-disabled employee in the seniority queue. It only affects one transfer to one position. As has 
 
135 Korobkin, supra note __, at 1228. 
136 Korobkin, supra note __, at 1228-29. 
137 Korobkin, supra note __, at 1251. 
138 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976); Barnett at 404-05. 
139 Franks 424 U.S. at 766, Barnett at 404-05. 
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been stated by many other scholars who criticized the result in the Barnett decision, if the non-
disabled employee did not get the desired transfer, he would still have the opportunity and the 
requisite seniority to transfer into the next available position in which he was interested.140 
Accordingly, this proposal does not take away the seniority rights of non-disabled employees; it 
only requires one transfer at one time, when necessary to keep a valuable employee employed. 
Finally, this proposed amendment is not the only limitation on the reasonable 
accommodation requirement. This amendment does not negate the undue hardship defense, and 
there are many accommodations that would truly pose such a hardship to employers.141 This 
proposed amendment would be limited to the situation where the accommodation does not pose 
any undue hardship to the employer based on an analysis of the factors (and is in fact often 
costless)142 but does negatively affect other non-disabled co-workers. Put another way, this 
amendment only determines the reasonableness of the accommodation. It does not answer the 
next question in the analysis—whether the accommodation creates an undue hardship for the 
employer.  
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
A. Achieving Equal Opportunity 
 
140 See, e.g., Befort, supra note __, at 982–83. 
141 For instance, forcing an employer to undertake significant legal liability, via suits by other employees, would 
possibly place an undue hardship on the employer. Thus, in situations where an employer is bound to a seniority 
system via contract, that employer might face legal liability if it violates the seniority system to give a transfer to a 
disabled employee.  However, as suggested in my discussion of the legislative history, for collective bargaining 
agreements adopted after the ADA was enacted, an employer and a union should  include a provision exempting 
accommodations made pursuant to the ADA from coverage under the collective bargaining agreement. Supra notes 
__ and accompanying text; see also Anderson, supra note __, at 41 (arguing that these issues should turn on the 
undue hardship analysis, which supports Congress’s intent in wanting to rid of the over-protection of employer’s 
policies that serve to subordinate the disabled); Befort, supra note__, at 981–82. 
142 Many accommodations, in fact, cost very little or nothing. Blanck, supra note __, at 902. 
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The legislative history of the ADA indicates that discrimination results not only from 
actions or inactions “that discriminate by effect as well as by intent or design,”143 but also from 
the “adoption or application of standards, criteria, practices or procedures that are based on 
thoughtlessness or indifference—that discrimination resulting from benign neglect.”144 
Accordingly, Congress declared that: “the Nation’s proper goal[] regarding individuals with 
disabilities [is] to assure equality of opportunity. . . .”145 Because Congress sought to give equal 
opportunity to individuals with disabilities, it sensibly included the reasonable accommodation 
provision. This proposal helps to further the goal of equal opportunity.  Disabled individuals 
must have an opportunity equal to that of non-disabled employees to compete and work in the 
workplace, considered in its entirety and not just in one particular job.146 Critics of this proposal 
might argue that with respect to a reassignment request, simply allowing a disabled employee to 
compete for the vacant position serves the goal of equal opportunity147 because the disabled 
individual is being given the same opportunity as the non-disabled employees.148 That argument 
might make sense if the goal of equal opportunity is limited to one particular position.  
However, the language and history of the ADA reveals that Congress envisioned an equal 
opportunity goal that encompassed the entire workplace of the employer and not just one 
position. Evidence of this intent can be gleaned from the fact that Congress included 
“reassignment” as a potential accommodation under the ADA.149 This inclusion is even more 
telling because, as stated earlier, the reassignment accommodation was not included in the 
 
143 Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, at 302. 
144 Id.
145 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). 
146 Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and Civil Rights Model of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE 
ADA 62,  85 (“Individuals should have access to the entire range of jobs available in the relevant labor market, not 
simply a means of obtaining some minimal foothold in the world of paid labor.”). 
147 EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). 
148 Id.
149 42 U.S.C. 12111(9). 
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regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, from which the reasonable 
accommodation provision of the ADA was derived.150 The fact that Congress chose to add the 
reassignment accommodation leads to the reasonable inference that Congress conceptualized a 
level of equality greater than simply allowing the disabled employee to have an opportunity to 
work in the one position for which he was hired; instead, Congress envisioned an equal 
opportunity goal that encompasses the entire workplace.  
If the goal of the ADA is to give disabled employees an equal opportunity to compete and 
work in the “workplace,” defined more broadly to include the entire company, then this proposal 
serves that goal of equal opportunity.151 If a non-disabled employee is not given a transfer, he 
still has the opportunity to continue to work for his employer. On the other hand, if a disabled 
employee is not given a transfer, he does not have the same opportunity to work for the 
employer; he would be terminated.152 Thus, my proposal, which would most often allow transfer 
accommodations, furthers the ADA’s clearly expressed goal of equal opportunity.153 
Other scholars have made arguments that support this approach. Professor Diller notes 
that courts’ suggestions that, rather than seek an accommodation, plaintiffs should find another 
 
150 Feldblum, supra note __, at 63–64; Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 297 
(2005) (stating that prior to the passage of the ADA, reassignment to another position was generally not considered a 
reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act) (citations omitted); Befort, Arizona, supra note __, at 944; 
Sarah Shaw, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use Available Mitigating 
Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1981, 2046, n. 25 (2002) (citations omitted); Andrikopoulos & 
Gould, supra note __, at 363–64 (arguing that the Barnett court erred in relying on Rehabilitation Act precedent, 
because there are differences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, most notably the provision of the 
“reassignment” accommodation under the ADA, yet not under the Rehabilitation Act); Alex Long, State Anti-
Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans With Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 611–12 
(2004) (stating that courts almost uniformly held that reassignment was not a required accommodation under the 
Rehabilitation Act); Befort, supra note __, at 449, 451–52 (discussing how prior to 1992, the Rehabilitation Act did 
not include a reassignment provision). 
151 Cf. Diller, supra note __, at 69–70 (noting that some courts suggest that the ADA only requires a baseline level of 
access to some jobs, but that this is a quite different objective than equal opportunity).  Some have even gone further 
to suggest that equality of opportunity in the broad sense is the chance to lead as happy of a life as everyone else. 
Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodations, 46 DUKE 
L. J. 1, 25 (1996). 
152 See Diller, supra note __  at 75 (stating that Barnett’s request for an accommodation is not a claim for 
redistribution of employer assets; instead it is a claim for “equality, fair play, and meritocracy”). 
153 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION. 
 
36
job where no accommodation is needed, “runs counter to the basic proposition for which ADA 
Title I stands, that people with disabilities should have access to the fullest possible range of 
jobs, within the limits of the reasonable accommodation principle.”154 
Some have argued that a transfer accommodation is different from other accommodations 
because other accommodations are needed to eliminate the obstacles and barriers caused by the 
non-disabled majority.155 For instance, re-configuring machines or job functions is more readily 
seen as equal opportunity because those obstacles prevent the disabled person from successfully 
working and were put in place with a bias toward the non-disabled.156 But a transfer 
accommodation can be seen in the same light.157 The only reason a disabled employee needs a 
transfer is because the employer is unable or unwilling to modify the employee’s existing job to 
rid of the barriers put in place without consideration of disabled individuals.158 Accordingly, a 
transfer accommodation is the same as any other type of accommodation: it simply eliminates 
the subordination of the disabled caused by designing workplaces around the bodies of the able-
bodied.159 
While critics might argue that special or preferential treatment cannot be equal 
opportunity, other disability-rights scholars disagree with that assertion. As Professor Ball has 
 
154 Diller, supra note __, at 69. 
155 Long, supra note __, at 871–72.  
156 Ball, supra note __, at 960. 
157 Id. at 962 (arguing that even a transfer accommodation serves the goal of equal opportunity because the transfer 
does not give the disabled employee an unfair advantage). 
158 Id. at 986–87. 
159 Harlan Hahn, Equality & the Environment: The Interpretation of “Reasonable Accommodations” in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHAB. ADMIN. 101, 103 (1993). Everything has been standardized for a 
model human being whose life is untouched by disability. All aspects of the built environment, including work sites, 
have been adapted for someone; the problem is that they have been adapted exclusively for the nondisabled 
majority.  Id.
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argued: the disability rights movement needs to “break the taboo that accompanies a discussion 
of preferential treatment in our society.”160 He further states: 
[T]he basic equality goals of the ADA will remain unfulfilled unless we are 
willing to provide individuals with disabilities, when appropriate, with reasonable 
forms of preferential treatment. Such treatment is not inconsistent with equality of 
opportunity in the area of disability; instead . . . the former is a necessary means 
for the attainment of the latter.161 
Because our society has been designed around the able-bodied, sometimes the only way to allow 
a disabled individual to remain a productive member of the workforce is to grant preferential 
treatment in the form of reasonable accommodations.  This proposal furthers Congress’ goal of 
equal opportunity by giving reasonable accommodations to individuals with disabilities when 
doing so is necessary to allow such an individual to remain employed. 
 B. Providing Guidance to Employers and Courts 
 Another justification for this proposal is that it provides a bright-line rule to give 
guidance to employers and courts when dealing with the conflicting interests of employees with 
and without disabilities. The state of the law is in flux regarding an employer’s obligation to 
accommodate a disabled employee when that accommodation affects other employees. If one 
accepts the narrow view of Barnett—that it only applies to reassignments that violate a seniority 
system—even that rule is subject to an exception. The Court stated in Barnett that ordinarily the 
defendant need only point to the existence of a valid seniority system to avoid 
accommodation,162 but the plaintiff can still demonstrate special circumstances to prove that the 
accommodation is reasonable despite the seniority system.163 Justice Scalia and others criticized 
the Court’s failure to develop a bright-line rule precisely because the lack of a clearer standard is 
 
160 Ball, supra note __, at 995. 
161 Id.
162 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405. 
163 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406. 
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likely to increase litigation.164 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, some believe that Barnett is not 
limited to cases where an accommodation violates a seniority system.165 Because the scope of 
Barnett is unclear, employers, courts, and lawyers will continue to be confused regarding an 
employer’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodations when they affect other 
employees.166 
This confusion serves no one well. It increases litigation because employers and disabled 
employees (as well as their lawyers) are unsure of the scope of an employer’s obligation to 
accommodate under the ADA. Uncertainty in the law also harms employers because it leads 
them into the proverbial catch-22. Employers often want to follow the law, and most employers 
would not enjoy terminating a disabled employee, especially if that employee was a valuable 
worker, despite his disability. But if an employer accommodates the disabled employee in a way 
that affects other employees, those employees are likely to protest such an action. Accordingly, 
employers are conflicted regarding whether or not to provide the accommodation, especially 
because the law as is stands now does not dictate the result. Even with respect to the 
reassignment accommodation, Barnett does not dictate the result. Barnett only states that an 
employer is often not required to accommodate—it does not state that the employer cannot
accommodate. Especially when the employer’s seniority system is unilateral and the employer 
 
164 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 412 (Scalia, dissenting); Campbell, supra note __; Andrikopoulos & Gould, supra note __ at 
347; Long, supra note __, at 893 (referring to the Court’s approach as a “standardless grab bag”); see also 
McDermott Will & Emery, “U.S. Supreme Court Bolsters the Integrity of Seniority Systems in Disability Case” 
(May 2002) (advising employers that questions remain after the Barnett decision). 
165 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
166 Evidence of this confusion can be gleaned from the bulletins or newsletters written by lawyers representing 
employers. For instance, attorneys from Kirkpatrick & Lockhart advised their clients that the Barnett rule could be 
extended to other disability-neutral workplace policies. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, K & L Alert: Employment Law 
(May 2002). They stated: “If an accommodation request violates a clearly established and closely adhered to 
personnel policy, and the accommodation would be unfair and disruptive to other employees and their expectations 
under the policy, an employer could deny the request as unreasonable.”  Id. Adams & Reese, LLP attorneys also 
questioned whether “the Supreme Court’s decision [applies] to other disability-neutral employment policies that 
control job assignments?” Adams & Reese, Labor and Employment ALERT: Bona Fide Seniority System Usually 
Trumps ADA Accommodation Request (June 2002).  
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has reserved the right to modify it at will (which most employers do), the employer can choose to 
make an exception to the seniority system by giving the disabled employee the transfer even 
though someone with more seniority also wants the position. Therefore, employers must make 
the difficult decision to favor either the disabled employee who needs the transfer to remain 
employed or the non-disabled co-workers who might be upset if the accommodation is given to 
the disabled employee.  
This proposal takes away that discretion by providing an easily applied bright-line rule. 
While some employers might prefer to have that discretion, others would likely prefer having the 
law dictate the result, in part because it gives the employer a justifiable excuse for 
accommodating the disabled employee: it is required by law. If this proposal was enacted, 
eventually employers would write exceptions into their seniority systems to let employees know 
that accommodating a disabled employee does not constitute a violation of the seniority system. 
Once this provision is known to employees, they would not have their expectations dashed when 
the employer transfers the disabled employee instead of the non-disabled co-workers.  
Because disabled employees and employers stand to benefit by the bright-line rule 
proposed in this Article, Congress should enact this amendment. Indeed, the fact that many 
employers might prefer this bright-line rule may help the political feasibility of the amendment’s 
enactment.  
C. Drawing an Analogy to Title VII 
 Since the ADA’s enactment, there have been several attempts by scholars to categorize 
the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA into the broader anti-discrimination vs. 
affirmative action debate.167 In other words, are accommodations necessary simply to achieve 
 
167 Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights,
89 VA. L. REV. 825, 828 (2003) 
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equal opportunity or do accommodations tip the scales in favor of disabled individuals and 
therefore constitute affirmative action?168 This subpart will briefly discuss this debate. However, 
regardless of whether reasonable accommodations are considered necessary to avoid 
discrimination or are considered affirmative action, this subpart will demonstrate that the 
amendment proposed in this Article is appropriate by drawing analogies to (relatively) well 
accepted Title VII jurisprudence.  
 1. Anti-Discrimination or Affirmative Action? 
 Although the ADA was modeled in part after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,169 
some believe it is premised on a very different theory of equality.170 The ADA was referred to as 
a “second generation” civil rights statute, “advancing formal and structural models of equality by 
imposing both a duty of accommodation and a duty of formal nondiscrimination.”171 Title VII is 
primarily an anti-discrimination statute, not requiring an employer to do anything affirmative, 
but rather, only requiring an employer not to discriminate.172 Other than in the religion 
context,173 Title VII does not require an employer to take any affirmative steps on behalf of a 
protected employee, and in fact, forbids an employer in most instances from granting preferential 
treatment to members of a minority group.174 Whereas Title VII only requires an employer to 
treat individuals equally, and not consider any prohibited classifications when making an 
 
168 This question matters to many people because traditional anti-discrimination law is viewed more favorably than 
affirmative action. 
169 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq. 
170 Krieger, supra note __, at 3.  
171 Krieger, supra note _, at 5.  
172 Id. at 3. 
173 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Feldblum, supra note __, at 66-67.  
174 42 U.S.C. §703(a); but see United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).  
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employment decision,175 the ADA is referred to as a “special treatment” statute, because it 
requires employers to sometimes treat employees differently because of their disability.176 
In fact, some argue that not only are accommodation mandates substantively different 
from antidiscrimination mandates, but that they actually rise to the level of affirmative action. 
For example, in one case,177 Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit criticized the EEOC’s position that reassignment to a vacant position required an 
employer to transfer a qualified, disabled employee even if he was not the most qualified for the 
position.178 The EEOC’s argument was that only requiring the employer to consider such an 
employee does not amount to an accommodation at all, but rather is an empty promise.179 Judge 
Posner referred to the EEOC’s policy as “affirmative action with a vengeance.”180 The allure of 
lumping together reasonable accommodations and affirmative action is compelling. Both 
concepts require an employer to take positive steps to overcome the historic disadvantages 
experienced by the subordinated group.181 
But these arguments do not tell the whole story, nor do they tell the more compelling 
story. From a practical perspective, reasonable accommodations vary from traditional affirmative 
action because reasonable accommodations focus on individuals rather than groups.182 On a 
 
175 Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and Civil Rights Model of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE 
ADA 62, 65. 
176 Id. at 65 (“The ADA’s requirement of ‘reasonable accommodation’ rests on the idea that, in some circumstances, 
people must be treated differently to be treated equally.”). 
177 EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). 
178 Id. at 1027-28. 
179 Id. at 1027 
180 Id. at 1029. 
181 Kay Schriner and Richard K. Scotch, The ADA and the Meaning of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA, 
164,  184; see also Karlan and Rutherglen, supra note __, at 14 (“Reasonable accommodation is affirmative action 
in the sense that it requires an employer to take account of an individuals disabilities to provide special treatment to 
him for that reason.”). Other scholars, however, note that even though commentators analogize affirmative action to 
the reasonable accommodation provision under the ADA, the statute in fact requires no affirmative action, and this 
actually hurts the disabled. Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, in BACKLASH 
AGAINST THE ADA 254, 260; Blanck, supra note __, at 893. 
182 Supra notes ____ and accompanying text. 
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theoretical level, many scholars have argued that accommodations simply further the goal of 
nondiscrimination, and are therefore not much different than other, more accepted anti-
discrimination laws.183 There are two primary arguments made. First, avoiding discrimination 
under traditional anti-discrimination statutes (such as Title VII) often costs an employer money 
much in the same way as accommodating an employee under the ADA.184 Second, the perceived 
physical limitations that require accommodation are not caused by the disability itself but by 
socially installed barriers put in place by the non-disabled majority. According to this argument, 
accommodations are needed simply to remedy the discrimination inherent in a workplace and 
society structured around the able bodied.185 
Christine Jolls makes the first argument above—that the accommodation requirements of 
statutes such as the ADA and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) are not much different 
from other anti-discrimination laws, specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, because both 
impose costs on employers for the benefit of a particular class of employees.186 Her argument 
that accommodations are similar to other anti-discrimination measures is based primarily on a 
comparison to disparate impact law under Title VII.187 Employers often have to avoid hiring 
 
183 See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 597 (2004); Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and 
Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 898–920 (2004) (arguing that the reasonable 
accommodation provision is very similar conceptually to our other antidiscrimination theories); Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 652 (2001) (arguing that other aspects of 
traditional antidiscrimination law, notably the disparate impact theory, are the same as accommodation 
requirements); Bagenstos, supra note __ at 834-35. 
184 See supra sources cited at __. 
185 See supra sources cited at __. 
186 Jolls, supra note __, at  649-51. 
187 Jolls, supra note __, at 651. 
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practices that have a disparate impact on minority groups even when those practices are 
economically efficient for the employer to use.188 
Scholars also argue that even avoiding simple discrimination (not making a distinction 
based on a protected category, such as race or sex) costs employers money if that discrimination 
could be considered “rational” discrimination. Because antidiscrimination law prohibits “rational 
discrimination,” that is, using race or sex as a proxy in what might be an economically sensible 
way for an employer, Samuel Bagenstos argues that “accommodation mandates . . . do nothing 
more than present a special case of the general problem of rational discrimination.”189 
As indicated above, the other primary argument made to equate accommodation 
mandates with anti-discrimination mandates is that accommodations are needed to remedy the 
discrimination inherent in a workplace structured around the able-bodied. For instance, Mary 
Crossley argues that “antidiscrimination laws are broadly concerned with the removal of barriers 
that prevent historically disadvantaged groups from enjoying equal opportunities to participate 
fully in the richness of American society”190 and that these barriers are not related to the 
disability itself but are caused by the way society has structured our world without consideration 
of the needs of the disabled person in mind.191 
Crossley also argues that because our society has been erecting barriers that deprive 
disabled persons of the full participation in society, that process itself is discriminatory.192 
188 Jolls, supra note __, at 652.   Disparate impact liability is a theory of liability first recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and later codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). A claim brought under a disparate impact theory does not allege that the employer had the 
intent do discriminate against the individual or group of individuals; but rather, argues that a neutral employment 
practice or selection criteria have a disproportionate adverse impact on the protected group. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
If the employer wishes to continue using such a criteria or following such a practice, it must prove that the practice 
is both job related and supported by business necessity. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  
189 Bagenstos, supra note __, at 866. 
190 Crossley, supra note _, at 863. 
191 Crossley, supra note __, at 863-64.  
192 Crossley, supra note __, at 890. 
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In that light, an order to “stop discriminating” will require employers and other 
entities covered by the ADA not only to stop building new barriers, but also to 
dismantle barriers already in place. Just as an order to take down a “whites only” 
sign over a drinking fountain is viewed not as a special benefit for black people, 
but as ending discrimination, so should the obligation to remove a less overt 
barrier to a disabled person’s participation be viewed.193 
Crossley also suggests that accommodations are only seen as seeking preferential or special 
treatment because the starting point by which we compare disabled individuals is the able-bodied 
population.194 She states: 
[O]ur view of accommodations as something special for disabled people fails to 
appreciate that our society constantly accommodates the needs of the non-
disabled majority. We just do not recognize those accommodations because of the 
ableist ethic that suffuses our society. We fail to recognize how much of the 
existing workplace scheme is built around the needs of the non-disabled, and we 
assume that this existing scheme is maximally productive just the way it is and 
that, consequently, any accommodation altering the dominant scheme will 
increase workplace cost and decrease productivity.195 
Thus, critics of accommodation costs use as a baseline for comparison a status quo that has 
already excluded the participation of disabled persons in the workforce.196 
Perhaps the most compelling argument is also the one most easily understood: 
accommodations are different from affirmative action, and therefore more like anti-
discrimination mandates, because they do not result in an unfair advantage for the disabled 
person. Rather, they simply level the playing field.197 The accommodation is needed simply to 
 
193 Crossley, supra note __, at 890. 
194 Crossley, supra note __, at 891. A similar argument is made by some feminists, who argue that women are only 
deemed inferior based on childbearing and childrearing responsibilities because the comparator is always a man.  
195 Crossley, supra note __, at 892-93. Anecdotally, I have noticed this phenomenon most often relating to work 
schedules and shifts. Employers often have set schedules and shifts not because they have determined that they 
maximize productivity but because they have always operated in a particular way and are unable or unwilling to 
conceptualize any schedule other than the status quo. Unfortunately, because schedule and shift changes are the 
most frequently requested accommodations, this bias toward the structures put in place by the able-bodied majority 
make it difficult for a disabled employee to get the accommodation she needs.  
196 Stein, supra note __, at 598. 
197 Ball, supra note __, at 960. 
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undo the discrimination inherent in the employer’s failure to structure the workplace considering 
the needs of all employees—rather than only the able-bodied (often male) employees.198 
2. Failure to Accommodate Equals Discrimination: This Proposed 
Amendment Remedies the Discrimination 
 
If accommodation mandates are the equivalent of antidiscrimination mandates, then the 
failure to accommodate is the equivalent of discrimination.199 And in fact, that is precisely what 
the ADA states.200 With respect to the reassignment accommodation, which is the focus of this 
Article as well as the Supreme Court decision in Barnett, accommodation is necessary to remedy 
the discrimination inherent in the employer’s failure201 to restructure the workplace to allow the 
disabled employee to continue to work in his or her current or original position. In other words, 
reassignment remedies the discrimination without the necessity of proving discrimination in the 
first case. 
 The question then becomes whether reassignment, with its burdens on other employees, 
is an appropriate remedy. An analogy to Title VII jurisprudence suggests the answer is yes. 
Specifically, I am referring to the Supreme Court case of Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co.202 The issue in that case was whether the court should grant retroactive seniority to victims 
of discrimination when doing so would arguably affect the seniority rights of other employees 
who were not in the class of persons discriminated against.203 
In Franks, the plaintiffs were a class of individuals who alleged that the employer had 
engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and discharge policies for its over-the-road truck driver 
 
198 Supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
199 See Crossley, supra note __. 
200 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A). 
201 This failure is either an inability or unwillingness to restructure the workplace. While I recognize that some 
positions simply cannot be modified to meet the physical restrictions of some disabled employees, many (if not 
most) jobs could be modified if the employer (and its managers) were able to see “outside the box.” 
202 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
203 Franks, 424 U.S. at 750. 
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positions.204 The court agreed with the plaintiffs.205 When deciding the appropriate remedy, the 
Court first noted that one of the central purposes of Title VII is to “make persons whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”206 Without granting 
retroactive seniority, the Court stated it would be impossible to put the victim of discrimination 
where he would have been absent the discrimination.207 Recognizing the importance of seniority 
systems, the majority held that “class-based seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal 
hiring discrimination is a form of relief generally appropriate under [Title VII]. . . .”208 
The Court then addressed the issue of the effect such an award of retroactive seniority 
will have on “innocent” third parties, namely the employees already hired. The Court stated:  
[I]t is apparent that denial of seniority relief to identifiable victims of racial 
discrimination on the sole ground that such relief diminishes the expectations of 
other, arguably innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate the 
central “make whole” objectives of Title VII. These conflicting interests of other 
employees will, of course, always be present in instances where some scarce 
employment benefit is distributed among employees on the basis of their status in 
the seniority hierarchy.209 
The Court also pointed out that if relief can be denied simply because other employees are 
unhappy about the relief received by victims of discrimination, “there will be little hope of 
correcting the wrongs to which the Act is directed.”210 
Justices Burger and Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, emphasized the 
inequity of granting competitive-type seniority relief at the expense of innocent employees. For 
instance, Chief Justice Burger stated: 
 
204 Franks, 424 U.S. at 750. 
205 Franks, 424 U.S. at 780. 
206 Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)). 
207 Franks, 424 U.S. at 765-66 (“Adequate relief may be well be denied in the absence of a seniority remedy slotting 
the victim in that position in the seniority system that would have been his had he been hired at the time of his 
application.”). 
208 Franks, 424 U.S. at 779. 
209 Franks, 424 U.S. at 774. 
210 Franks, 424 U.S. at 775 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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[C]ompetitive-type seniority relief at the expense of wholly innocent employees 
can rarely, if ever, be equitable if that term retains traditional meaning. More 
equitable would be a monetary award to the person suffering the discrimination. 
An award such as “front pay” could replace the need for competitive-type 
seniority relief. Such monetary relief would serve the dual purpose of deterring 
wrongdoing by the employer or union—or both—as well as protecting the rights 
of innocent employees. In every respect an innocent employee is comparable to a 
“holder-in-due-course” of negotiable paper or a bona fide purchaser of property 
without notice of any defect in the seller’s title. In this setting I cannot join in 
judicial approval of “robbing Peter to pay Paul.”211 
Despite Chief Justice Burger’s discomfort with what he sees as the inequity of retroactive 
seniority, the Court stated that their holding—“sharing of the burden of the past discrimination is 
presumptively necessary”—is consistent “with any fair characterization of equity jurisdiction . . . 
.”212 Furthermore the Court noted that it has long held that “employee expectations arising from a 
seniority system agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy 
interest.”213 
The lesson from this case is simple: If seniority systems bargained for under a collective 
bargaining agreement can be violated in order to remedy discrimination even when there is 
specific statutory provision protecting seniority systems under Title VII,214 then certainly a 
seniority system can be violated in order to remedy discrimination under the ADA, where there 
 
211 Franks, 424 U.S. at 780-81 (citations omitted). 
212 Franks, 424 U.S. at 777 (citations omitted). 
213 Franks, 424 U.S. at 778 (citations omitted). 
214 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). This section states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system. . . .” Id. 
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is no equivalent to the seniority system exemption under Title VII.215 If one accepts the argument 
that the failure to accommodate is the equivalent of discrimination, then the “remedy” of 
reassignment, even when it violates a seniority system, is an appropriate one.  
3. If Accommodation Equals Affirmative Action, This Proposal Represents 
Lawful Affirmative Action  
 
As stated above,216 many scholars have argued that the reasonable accommodation 
provision of the ADA is substantively different from traditional anti-discrimination laws, and is 
indeed more akin to affirmative action. I have already disagreed with this conclusion above, but 
even if one accepts the argument that reasonable accommodations amount to affirmative action, 
the amendment proposed in this Article should still be considered valid as lawful affirmative 
action under well-settled (although not uncontroversial) Title VII affirmative action 
jurisprudence.  Specifically, this proposed amendment would pass the test announced in the 
leading Title VII affirmative action case, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.217 
In that case, the employer and the union agreed to remedy the significant disparity of 
minority craft workers by implementing a training program to allow current production workers 
to receive training that would allow them to move up into one of the craft positions.218 Selection 
of those eligible for the training program was made on the basis of seniority except that at least 
50% of the new trainees had to be black until the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the 
 
215 This argument was also made in a Note by Sandy Andrikopoulos and Theo E. M. Gould, Living in Harmony? 
Reasonable Accommodations, Employee Expectation and US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 345 (2003). They argued that the Court’s decision in Barnett was at odds with the Court’s decision in Franks,
stating “The Supreme Court found that while accommodating the racially discriminated employee would have some 
detrimental impact on his coworkers’ interests, ‘employee expectations arising from a seniority system agreement 
may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy interest.’ ” Id. at 372. The authors are correct about the 
holding of the Franks decision but they missed an important distinction. In Franks, there was already a finding that 
the employer had discriminated against minority employees. Accordingly, the issue was one of remedy. In order to 
argue that this precedent is binding, we first need to make the argument that the reassignment accommodation is 
needed as a remedy for the discrimination inherent in the employer’s failure to accommodate the employee in his 
original position.  
216 Supra Part IV.C.1. 
217 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
218 Weber, 443 U.S. at 199. 
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plant was approximately the same as the percentage of blacks in the local work force.219 The 
affirmative action plan was challenged by a white employee who was passed up for the training 
program in favor of a black employee with less seniority.220 The Supreme Court, relying on the 
legislative history of Title VII, held that voluntary affirmative action plans may be valid under 
Title VII, as long as they meet the following test.221 First, the Court looked at whether the 
employer has a justification for undertaking an affirmative action effort.222 To make such a 
finding, the plan must have as its purpose the elimination of a manifest racial imbalance.223 
Second, the court then considered the burdens of the plan on the rights of those who are not 
beneficiaries.224 As the Weber court stated, the plan must not “unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of white males.”225 In determining that the plan in Weber did not unnecessarily trammel 
the interest of the white employees, the Court looked at the following factors: (1) the plan did not 
require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees; (2) the plan 
did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; and (3) the plan was a 
temporary measure, not intended to maintain racial balance but to eliminate the manifest racial 
imbalance.226 
If the amendment proposed in this Article was adopted, accommodations given pursuant 
to it would clearly pass this test. First, it is beyond debate that there has always been and will 
likely always be in the future, a manifest imbalance in the number of disabled persons in the 
 
219 Weber, 443 U.S. at 199. 
220 Weber, 443 U.S. at 199. 
221 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. In all fairness, the Court did not definitively state that this was a “test” for courts to 
follow but it has since been perceived as such.  See Chris Engels, Voluntary Affirmative Action in Employment for 
Women & Minorities Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Extending Possibilities for Employers to Engage in 
Preferential Treatment to Achieve Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 731, 748 (1991) (noting 
that while the court refused to set a clear line of demarcation, the guidelines in Weber have been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court and lower courts as a “test” to apply). 
222 Engels, supra note __, at 747. 
223 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
224 Engels, supra note __, at 747. 
225 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
226 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
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workforce. Second, an accommodation pursuant to the amendment will never unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of non-disabled individuals.  
The proposed amendment meets the second part of the test because the proposed 
amendment does not require the discharge of non-disabled employees and the hiring of disabled 
employees.227 Furthermore, a reassignment accommodation would not keep non-disabled 
employees permanently relegated to inferior jobs. The able-bodied employee who does not get 
the transfer (if it is given to a disabled employee as an accommodation) is still employed and will 
have other opportunities to transfer in the future.  Unlike a Title VII affirmative action plan 
where there might be many women and/or minorities who could conceivably continue to get the 
desired positions ahead of white males, in the case of an accommodation under the ADA, there 
simply are not that many disabled individuals. Furthermore, the ADA requires that decisions 
regarding whether someone is disabled and whether an accommodation should be given must be 
made only after an individualized inquiry,228 which is very similar to the case-by-case approach 
used in the Court-approved affirmative action plan in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.229 
Professor Silvers has drawn a similar comparison between the affirmative action test in 
Weber and reasonable accommodations.230 She argues that as long as accommodations to 
disabled individuals can be seen as sharing privilege and recognition, rather than shifting it from 
one group to another (i.e., from the non-disabled to the disabled) then accommodations should be 
given.231 In so arguing, she recognizes some of the resentment toward affirmative action, but 
argues that courts have traditionally accepted or rejected affirmative action programs based on 
 
227 See Engels, supra note __, at 787-88 (noting that the Court in Weber makes a point of emphasizing that the 
affirmative action plan did not require the discharge of white employees and the hiring of minorities). 
228 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999); See 42 U.S.C. 12102. 
229 Engels, supra note __, at 775 (citing to Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616  (1987)). 
230 Silvers, supra note __. Other scholars have suggested that the lessons taken from disability law, and especially, 
reasonable accommodation law, can be used as an example for racial and gender discrimination by eliminating the 
fallacy that jobs can only be structured in one particular way. See generally, Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note __. 
231 Id. at 562. 
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differences between sharing privilege and merely shifting it from one group to another.232 By 
unnecessarily presuming that accommodating disabled workers under the ADA means shifting 
privilege rather than sharing it, Silvers argues that the Supreme Court has misjudged the nature 
of the reasonable accommodation provision.233 
Comparing disability law to other discrimination law, Silvers argues that courts have long 
distinguished between remedies that result in reverse discrimination because they shift 
recognition from one group to another, and remedies that pass constitutional and statutory tests 
because they share recognition.234 Reasonable accommodations given under the ADA, according 
to Silvers, would share recognition, not shift recognition, and should therefore be seen similarly 
to lawful affirmative action programs. This is so because most accommodations given under the 
ADA do not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the non-disabled employees, which is the 
hallmark of a lawful affirmative action program under Title VII.235 Silvers suggests that drawing 
the line between accommodations that do and do not unnecessarily trammel the interests of non-
disabled employees is difficult.236 This proposal will help draw that line. 
V. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS 
A. The Backlash Issue 
Despite the overwhelming enthusiasm that accompanied the passage of the ADA,237 there 
is just as much agreement that the ADA, at least Title I of the ADA that governs employment, 
 
232 Id.
233 Id. This result not only sets up disabled people for resentment from fellow workers but also results in the failure 
to respond affirmatively to their differences. 
234 Id. at 563. 
235 Id. at 580 (citing United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the major employment 
affirmative action case); see also Ball, supra note __, at 963 (arguing that accommodations do not give disabled 
employees an unfair advantage over able-bodied employees). 
236 Id. at 580. 
237 COLKER, supra note __, at 5–6. 
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has not lived up to its potential.238 An often-cited study indicates that employers have prevailed 
in 92% of ADA cases filed in court.239 After exploring and dismissing other reasons for the lack 
of success in ADA cases—weak claims, poorly drafted statute, confusion over a new statute—
Professor Diller suggests that the high failure rate of ADA cases is caused by a judicial backlash 
against the ADA.240 He states: “The term backlash suggests an hostility to the statute and toward 
those who seek to enforce it. The backlash thesis suggests that judges are not simply confused by 
the ADA; rather, they are resisting it.”241 Diller opines that the backlash may not be an 
intentional effort to thwart the rights of the disabled. Instead, it may be the failure to comprehend 
and accept the underpinnings of the statute.242 Other scholars have devoted entire books or 
sections of books to discussing the backlash against the ADA and there appears to be very little 
debate that the backlash does indeed exist.243 
The backlash is most profoundly seen in the narrow interpretation the Supreme Court has 
given to the definition of “disability.”244 Professor Mezey states: “There is consensus among 
most disability scholars and disability rights advocates that the federal courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, are chiefly responsible for the constrained implementation of the ADA. . .”245 In 
addition to the narrow interpretation the Court has given to the term “disability,” this Article 
demonstrates that the Court has given a similarly narrow interpretation to the phrase “reasonable 
accommodation.”  
 
238 See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 VAND. L. 
REV 1807 (arguing that while there is plenty of scholarship devoted to the failure of Title I, there has been more 
success under Titles II and III). 
239 COLKER, supra note __, at 71–84; see also Diller, supra note __, at 62. 
240 Id. at 63–64. 
241 Id. at 64. 
242 Diller, supra note__, at 65. 
243 Krieger, supra note _; MEZEY, supra note __; COLKER, supra note __, 96-125.  
244 Supra sources cited at note __; MEZEY, supra note __, at 48–58; COLKER, supra note __, at 96. 
245 MEZEY, supra note __ at 44. 
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Some have suggested that ignoring the rights of the non-disabled246 will contribute to the 
backlash against the ADA. Professor Long states:  
Several authors have charged that courts are reluctant to give full effect to the 
ADA because they view the statute as creating “special rights” for individuals 
with disabilities or because they are resistant to the notion that sometimes equality 
of opportunity may require unequal treatment. There can be no question that the 
ADA requires “preferential” treatment in the sense that it may require different 
treatment of disabled and non-disabled employees. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that “preferential” treatment of individuals with disabilities 
should amount to detrimental treatment of non-disabled employees. There is 
perhaps no better way to ensure that courts remain reluctant to fully effectuate the 
ADA’s broad remedial goals than to adopt such a reading of the statute.247 
Similarly, Professor Colker has argued that because the failure of the ADA is caused by hostility 
by the judiciary, even amending the statute is unlikely to solve the problems with the ADA.248 
I am very cognizant of the potential that any statutory amendment that would give 
additional protection to individuals with disabilities will be viewed with hostility. One step this 
proposal takes to ameliorate additional hostility toward disabled individuals is to ensure that no 
non-disabled person would be fired because of the reasonable accommodation provision under 
the ADA. However, I realize that this might not be enough, and that there is a very real concern 
that the backlash against the ADA would continue unless it is possible for additional legislation 
to influence public opinion and the judiciary’s opinion of the ADA. Some have argued that 
legislation can influence society’s beliefs. Professor Ball, for example, believes that we need to 
educate the public and judges to destigmatize the idea of preferential treatment for the disabled.  
He states: 
The public, as well as judges, need to be educated on the crucial role that 
preferential treatment can play in providing equality of opportunity to individuals 
with disabilities. . . . We need, in other words, to shift our understanding of 
 
246 I do not think my proposal ignores the rights of the non-disabled. Instead, I believe it sensibly and fairly weighs 
the interests of both the non-disabled and disabled individuals. 
247 Long, supra note  , at 899. 
248 COLKER, supra note __, at 3. 
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preferential treatment in disability discrimination law from one that renders such 
treatment as suspect to one that views it as legitimate and necessary. One way of 
doing this is to make a positive case on behalf of preferential treatment by 
explaining the role that it plays in promoting equality of opportunity for 
individuals with disabilities.249 
Others agree that education is what is missing in the disability movement.250 Professor Davis 
believes that we will never have a reversal of the backlash against the ADA until the majority of 
Americans are educated about individuals with disabilities.251 Maybe an amendment will help 
serve the purpose of educating the courts and the public. 
 B. Sharing the Burden of Accommodation: A Communitarian Approach 
Perhaps the most significant argument to be made against this proposal is that employers 
should have to bear all of the cost of accommodation, rather than passing some of the cost onto 
the rest of the workforce. In other words, even if we accept that the disabled employee should be 
accommodated, the question remains, who should pay the cost of accommodation? Because it is 
often the employer who has created the workplace and its structures with a bias toward the able-
bodied, there is a compelling argument to be made that the employer should have to bear the cost 
of remedying that discrimination. This argument is similar to the one made in the concurrence/ 
dissent in the Franks case discussed earlier, where Justice Burger compared the innocent 
employee whose seniority is trumped to a “holder-in-due-course” of negotiable paper in the 
commercial context.252 Justice Burger made the argument that if the employer has two competing 
obligations—to the victim of discrimination and to the other employees in the workplace—the 
employer should have to bear the cost of its discrimination.253 
249 Ball, supra note __, at 989–90 
250 Leonard J. Davis, Bending Over Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, & the Law, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE 
ADA 98,112 (noting that we teach our children about sex and race but not about disability). 
251 Id. at 117. 
252 See supra Part IV.B.2.; Franks, 424 U.S. at 781. 
253 See Franks, 424 U.S. at 781. 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION. 
 
55
The argument is especially compelling in light of the fact that the legislative history of 
the ADA states that after the passage of the Act, employers and unions should negotiate their 
collective bargaining agreements in a way that does not interfere with the provisions of the 
ADA.254 In other words, it was Congress’s intent that issues like the one in Barnett would not 
arise because employers and unions would have drafted exceptions to their seniority systems in 
order to comply with the Act. Certainly if Congress intended employers and unions to negotiate 
their collective bargaining agreements to make way for the ADA, employers with unilateral 
seniority systems also would be expected to have an exception written into their seniority 
systems to handle the scenario in Barnett. For all of these reasons, it is indeed a strong argument 
that employers should have the burden of “paying” for its conflicting obligations to both the 
disabled employee under the ADA and the non-disabled employee under the seniority system. 
While a payment of money would not have been sufficient for Barnett, for whom there was no 
other job within the company, a payment of money might have pacified the individual with more 
seniority that wanted Barnett’s mailroom position. 
 However, a rule that does not allow an employer to shift some of the “cost” of 
accommodation to the rest of the workforce would be unworkable, contrary to Congress’s intent 
and inefficient. In reality, if an employer can give another accommodation that does not 
adversely affect other employees, it will often choose to do so. It may not want to infringe on 
other employees’ rights, so it bears the burden itself. For instance, one employer with rotating 
shifts might allow itself to be under-staffed on one shift and over-staffed on another to avoid 
having to make other employees work the less desirable shifts more often in order to 
accommodate the disabled employee who needs a set schedule. But if the employer did not 
choose to voluntarily mismanage its shifts (or became weary of doing so after having 
 
254 S. REP. NO. 101-116 at 32. 
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accommodated for awhile), this employer might have a decent argument that such a sacrifice 
creates an undue burden for the employer. Accordingly, under the current structure of the ADA, 
a proposal putting the burden of all accommodations on an employer would likely lead to many 
accommodations not being given because they would result in an undue hardship for the 
employer. One might argue that we should then eliminate the undue hardship defense, but that 
proposal would clearly be contrary to Congress’s intent when drafting the ADA.255 
A rule that would put the entire burden of accommodation on the employer is also 
inefficient. Using the example above (rotating shifts), it is more efficient for other employees to 
rotate through the less desirable shift more often than it is for the employer to over-staff and 
under-staff its shifts in order to accommodate the disabled employee. The same inefficiency can 
be found with the reassignment accommodation. If we required a result where an employer could 
not pass the “burdens” of accommodation onto its other employees (at least not without 
compensation), an employer would have to pay extra to the non-disabled employee who does not 
get the transfer, when that employee is not performing any additional tasks to warrant the extra 
compensation, nor is he any more valuable.   
 In addition to these pragmatic concerns, another justification for passing some of the 
costs of accommodation onto other employees can be drawn from the literature regarding the 
“communitarian theory.” The communitarian theory is considered one critique (of several) of 
liberal theory, which bases its view of equality on the idea that our shared human traits do more 
to define us than the things that make us different, like sex, race, national origin, etc.256 Liberal 
theory considers individuals as self-reliant and autonomous, without dependence on other 
 
255 Need cite. 
256 Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Right Places: Feminist and Communitarian Elements of Disability 
Discrimination Law, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 105, 114, 123-26 (2005). 
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individuals.257 Professor Ball argues that the ADA, specifically the reasonable accommodation 
provision, is at odds with the liberal theory of equality, precisely because the liberal theory both 
emphasizes the role that “sameness plays in its vision of equality” and because it understands 
individuals to be “equally self-reliant and independent beings.”258 He looks to both feminist 
theory and communitarianism as providing alternative theories to support the ADA.259 
Communitarians criticize the liberal view that conceptualizes individuals as separate and 
distinct from the communities to which they belong. Instead, communitarians believe that the 
communities to which we belong, including our family, employer, and neighborhood, help to 
define who we are and what we believe.260 Professor Ball states that: “Communitarians argue 
that individuals have no meaningful identity independent of their ties to others. Instead, ties of 
friendship, obligation, and loyalty provide individuals with their sense of identity and bind them 
to the lives and well-being of others.”261 Communitarians also criticize liberal theory’s attempt to 
put individual rights ahead of the public good. While they believe in individual rights, they 
believe that those rights too frequently trump the responsibilities that individuals owe to others as 
well as what is in the public’s best interest.262 Accordingly, communitarians believe that liberal 
theory causes individuals to alienate each other because everyone is only concerned for 
themselves and their own interests.263 
When one views reasonable accommodations that affect other employees, the 
communitarian theory supports this Article’s attempt to spread the burden of accommodation 
beyond the employer’s pocketbook and to the rest of the workplace, as a community. It is 
 
257 Ball, supra note __, at 113. 
258 Ball, supra note __, at 113. 
259 Ball, supra note __, at 114. I only will be focusing on the communitarian theory in this Article. 
260 Ball, supra note __, at 122-23. 
261 Ball, supra note __, at 123. 
262 Ball, supra note __, at 125. 
263 Ball, supra note __, at 125-26. 
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without doubt that the ADA furthers the interests of not just disabled individuals but of society as 
a whole, who are all better off by increasing the employment opportunities for qualified 
individuals with disabilities, and thereby decreasing those individuals’ reliance on public 
subsidies. Instead of requiring only the employer to bear the cost of accommodation, when it is 
much more efficient to spread that cost out to other employees, a communitarian approach 
supports sharing the cost of accommodation. Consider the above example of an employee 
requiring a set shift, presumably the sought-after day shift, when all other employees are required 
to rotate through the shifts. As noted above, if there was a rule that precluded an employer from 
giving an accommodation that affected other employees, the employer would be required to 
under-staff its afternoon and night shifts, and over-staff its day shift, which is undoubtedly an 
inefficient result. The communitarian approach would look to the community as a whole, and the 
ties that bind that community of “friendship, obligation, and loyalty” and would deem it not only 
fair but necessary to spread the burden in a reasonable way to the rest of the workforce, by 
asking that everyone rotate through the less desirable shift more often in order to provide the 
accommodation of the straight shift to the disabled employee without unduly tying the hands of 
the employer.  
What occurs with reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals is really no 
different than the type of community support and accommodation that takes place every day in 
the workplace. Employees help other employees. If one employee experiences a death in the 
family, other employees would certainly rally around that employee to give her the support she 
needs, and to cover for her during her absences. If another employee injures himself skiing, 
certainly his co-workers would not balk at having to do more of the heavy lifting because he is 
temporarily unable to do so. Employees do these things because they care about the community 
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in which they work, and they realize that the loyalty given to that community also benefits them. 
While many people look at individuals with disabilities as the ultimate “other” with a strong 
sense of “that could never be me,” the truth is that any one could become disabled at any time. 
Keeping valuable disabled employees in the workforce not only benefits the company as a 
whole, but being part of a community that shares each other’s burdens, in the long run, benefits 
everyone.  
CONCLUSION
Congress’s goal in enacting the ADA was to provide equal opportunity for individuals 
with disabilities.264 Achieving this goal must include an attempt to accommodate disabled 
employees as often as possible in order to allow them to remain productive and valuable 
members of the workforce, even when such an accommodation affects other employees. Because 
the comparative consequences to the two groups of employees almost always favors 
accommodation, this Article has suggested that Congress amend the ADA to add a rule to the 
reasonable accommodation provision, requiring employers and courts to grant accommodations 
of last resort even if the accommodation does or could affect the rights or interests of other 
employees, unless the accommodation would result in another employee’s termination.265 This 
amendment is necessary to remedy the discrimination inherent in the inability or unwillingness 
of employers to restructure their workplaces to rid of discriminatory barriers, and is a reasonable 
burden to share with the rest of the workforce without unnecessarily infringing on their rights.  
 
264 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). 
265 Supra Part III.A. 
